19世纪的金融繁荣与萧条：德国的格伦德克里斯有多糟糕？（英）2025

*This papercould not have beenwrittenwithout Mico Mrkaic, who generously shared theStatacode hewrotefor Berger et al.(2015) with the author.I am also grateful toMico, Carsten Burhop, and Margrit Grabasforhelpful commentsand discussions.IMF Working PaperAsia and Pacific DepartmentFinancial Boom and Bust in the 19thCentury: How BadWas Germany’sGründerkrise?Prepared byJohannes Wiegand*Authorized for distribution byThomas HelblingJuly2025IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.ABSTRACT:TheGründerkriseof the 1870smarks Germany’s firstmajor experience with financial boom andbust. The assessment of its real impact has, however, been hampered by the non-ability of comprehensive andreliable national accounts data for the 19thcentury. This short paper seeks to overcome such difficulties bycombining common factor analysis as proposed by Sarferaz and Uebele (2009) with financial filtering a la Borioet al. (2013) and Berger et al. (2015). The results confirm that theGründerkrisewas by farmodern Germany’sworst peacetime economic crisis prior to the Great Depression in the late 1920s. Financial and monetary forcesamplified the boom of 1871-73, deepened the downturn in 1874-79, and acted as a drag on the recovery untilwell into the 1880s. The pattern resembles modern ‘balance sheet recessions’,i.e., protracted economicRECOMMENDED CITATION:Wiegand, Johannes (2025):Financial Boom and Bust in the 19thCentury: HowBad Was Germany’sGründerkrise? IMF Working Paper WP 25/136, Washington D.C.C38, G01, N13Gründerboom;Gründerkrise;German economic history;financialcrisis;balance sheet recession;factor analysis;financial filterjwiegand@imf.org weakness in the aftermath of financial crises. JEL Classification Numbers:Author’s E-Mail Address: Keywords: ContentsI.Introduction and Historical Context.....................................................................................................................2II.Methodologyand Data...........................................................................................................................................4III.Main Results...........................................................................................................................................................5IV.An Activity Factor for 1820-1913and an Illustration......................................................................................6V.Conclusions............................................................................................................................................................8Annex:Scoring Coefficients and Financial Factors...........................................................................................10References.................................................................................................................................................................12FIGURESFigure 1:Berlin Assets Prices, 1865-85…………………………………………………………………………..…...2Figure 2: Activity Factor and Financial Accelerator, 1865-1913…….………………………………………...…...5Figure 3: Activity Factor and Financial Accelerator, 1820-1913………………………………………..……..…...6Figure 4:The Impact of Filtering: an Illustration………………………………………………………………...…...7Figure A1: Scoring Coefficients, Activity Factor………………………………………………………………...…10Figure A2: Scoring Coefficients, Financial Factor….…………………………………………………………...…10Figure A3: Financial Factors……………………………………………...………………………………………...…11 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDIntroductionand HistoricalContextTheGründerkriseof the 1870smarksGermany’s firstmajor,traumaticexperience withfinancial boom and bust(Figure 1).Followingthefoundingof the GermanEmpire in 1871,an enormous financial boomunfolded:commercial credit expanded rapidly,hundreds of new companiessprung up andwerelisted on the stockmarket, andcorporatestock and real estatereachedhitherto unknown valuations.1Only two years later,fortunes reversed sharply. In May1873, the stock market inneighboring Vienna collapsed,bringingfinancial expansion inGermanytoahold.In October, the—only recently established—Quistorp’sche Vereinsbankcollapsed. Its bankruptcywasfollowedby abroad-basedcrashin equity valuations and aseries of high-profile bank and corporate failures.As events unfolded,it gradually sank in toobserversthat theywere facingnot onlyafinancial collapse,but alsoaHandelskrise:aprotractedeconomic downturn that lasted at least for theremainder of the 1870s and possiblyevenlonger (seee.g. Wirth,1882)2.Systematic attempts atbusinesscycledatingcarried out inthe 20thand 21stcenturieshave, for the most part,confirmedthisassessment.3At the same time,thesestudiesuseddifferent dataandmethodological approaches, and it is therefore no surprisethat a consensus about theGründerkrise’sintensi