金融稳定理论符合现实（英）

Nina Boyarchenko|Kinda Hachem|Anya Kleymenova The Theory of Financial Stability Meets RealityNina Boyarchenko,Kinda Hachem,andAnya KleymenovaFederalReserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no.1155June2025https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1155 Abstract A large literature at the intersection of economics and finance offers prescriptions for regulatingbanks toincrease financial stability. This literature abstracts from the discretionthat accounting standards givebanks over financial reporting, creating a gap between theinformation assumed to be available toregulators in models of optimal regulation and the informationavailable to regulators in reality. Webridge insights from the economics, finance,and accounting literatures to synthesize knowledge about thedesign and implementationof bank regulation and identify areas where more work is needed. We presenta simpleframework for organizing the relevant ideas, namely the externalities that motivate bankregulation, the rationales for allowing accounting discretion, and the use of discretion tocircumventregulation. Our takeaway from reviewing work in these areas is that academicstudies of bank regulationand accounting discretion require a more unified approach to designoptimal policy for the real world. JEL classification:D62, E44, G21, G28, M41Keywords:bank regulation, accounting discretion, regulatory arbitrage, financial stability, optimal policy Boyarchenko, Hachem: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (emails:nina.boyarchenko@ny.frb.org,kinda.hachem@ny.frb.org).Kleymenova:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System(email:anya.kleymenova@frb.gov).The authorsthank David Romer and four anonymous referees for manyinsightful comments.Theyalso thankWilliam Bassett, Christopher Finger, João Santos, Cindy Vojtech,and especially Jim Naughton for helpfulconversations. This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interestedreaders solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author(s) and do not necessarily reflect theposition of theFederal Reserve Board, theFederal ReserveBank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of theauthor(s). 1. Introduction Banking is a heavily regulated industry, yet it remains prone to large and costly disrup-tions. Over the past forty years, the U.S. has experienced two systemic banking crises: thesavings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s and the global financial crisis (GFC) that beganin 2007. It has also experienced more localized disruptions such as the failure of ContinentalIllinois in May 1984 and the regional banking distress sparked by the collapse of SiliconValley Bank (SVB) in March 2023, both resolved with interventions by the Federal Reservebefore the problems had a chance to spread more widely into systemic concerns. While these four episodes are not the only examples of financial turmoil in the U.S. sincethe end of World War II, they have in common an accumulation of risk exposures on boththe asset and liability side of bank balance sheets that was not transparent to regulators atthe time. In contrast, episodes such as the 1987 stock market crash, the 1994 bond marketcrisis, the 1997 failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), and even to some extentthe market distress at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic were characterized by financialinstitutions’ hedged positions not performing as ex ante expected—that is, by institutionstaking hedged bets on financial market movements that ex post did not pay off. Table 1 summarizes the accumulation of risks on the asset side of bank balance sheetsas well as the heavy reliance on short-term, runnable, and often uninsured liabilities thatpreceded the failure of Continental Illinois, the S&L crisis, the GFC, and the March 2023distress. These disruptions occurred despite the regulatory infrastructure that emerged fromthe Great Depression. In fact, the GFC occurred during the phase-in of the Basel II Accordsfor improved capital adequacy regulation, and the March 2023 distress occurred in the muchmore heavily regulated post-GFC environment. Are regulators missing something? Is the academic literature missing something insofaras its ability to inform regulators?Does the banking industry need more regulation, lessregulation, or just different regulation? An equally important but more focused question iswhether existing regulations could be made more successful without changing the regulations themselves. That is, has the effectiveness of regulation been hampered by outside factors,specifically factors outside the scope of most models of banking and bank regulation? An active academic literature studies the theoretical underpinnings of bank decision-making, the externalities that those decisions impart on other banks and the macroeconomymore generally, and the policy interventions that may mitigate such externalities.Whilethese theoretical