2026年IMD世界竞争力排名

Table of Contents June 2026 IMD WORLD COMPETITIVENESS BOOKLET 2026 ISBN-13978-2-940485-66-6ISSN1026-2628 Copyright © 2026IMD –International Institute for Management Development23, Ch. de BelleriveP.O. Box 915CH-1001 LausanneSwitzerland e-mail: wccinfo@imd.orgInternet: www.imd.org/wccDatabase: https://worldcompetitiveness.imd.org/ Choose the productthat meets your needs Visit our e-shop:www.wcceshop.org This booklet is just a summary.The complete Yearbook with full profiles and all thestatistics is available digitally and in print. Visit our e-shop:www.wcceshop.org Preface The economy, security, and technology canno longer be treated as separate concepts, inStubb’s words. As such, countries can remaincompetitive not by choosing between realismor values, nor by choosing between opennessor security, but by embedding all four ininstitutions that are credible, enforceable, andtrusted. within visible limits. And this is why somecountries with elaborate legal architecturesunderperform, while others with leanerstatute books outperform. The practicalquestion isn’t how many rules exist, butwhether such rules are believable. Every year I am asked the same question: whatmakes an economy competitive? And everyyear, the honest answer drifts a little furtherfrom the textbook one. Gaza has shattered any remaining pretencethat civilian protection norms are universallyapplied. The Russian invasion of Ukrainecontinues into its fifth year. And multiplearmed conflicts across Africa –from theSahel to Sudan to the eastern Congo –havedisplaced more people than at any point thiscentury. Costs matter. Scale matters. Talent,technology, infrastructure, and market accessall matter. And yet, none of them explainwhy –in a world that is visibly fragmenting–capital, people, and trust keep gravitatingtoward the same handful of places. Theyaren’t always the cheapest, largest, or mosttechnologically advanced of places, but theyare places where people believe in the rules. The global setting makes the argument moreurgent. Trade tensions are rising. Policyuncertainty is elevated. FDI is weak. Publictrust is thin. Resilience, strategic autonomy,and selective integration have replaced theolder default of open integration. In 2025,68% of countries went backwards on rule oflaw. Citizens, on average, trusted their courtsmore (54%) than their national governments(39%) or their parliaments (37%). Elsewhere, Asia faces sharpening threats tointernational peace, from the Taiwan Straitto the Korean Peninsula and the South ChinaSea. Latin America has its own version ofthe same crisis, most starkly in the unlawfulUnited States’ intervention against Venezuela,which has been carried out without theauthorization of the Security Council andagainst the basic prohibition on the use offorce in another sovereign state’s territory. Strong long-term performers in the WCRseem to be rule-of-law abiders, butrule-breaking or selectively rule-using actorsseem to be capable of achieving impressive,short-run gains through scale, coercivecoordination, commodity rents or strategicarbitrage. The 2026 WCR surfaces thiscomplexity. All that may sound a little schoolmasterly.But a major finding of the 2026 IMD WorldCompetitiveness Ranking (WCR) is that manyof the economies at the top of the table arenot the most developed economies, nor thelargest exporters, nor the biggest markets. So,what are they? Countries that uphold the ruleof law most consistently. Two recent voices help as supportingarchitecture: Mark Carney’s and AlexanderStubb’s. Carney’s 2026 Davos argument–from financing the transition in 2022, tothe “rewiring” of trade and energy in 2024,plus his blunt 2026 verdict that the world isin a “rupture, not a transition”–captures therealization that the old bargain is dead, andthat a “world of fortresses” would be poorer,more fragile, and less sustainable. As always, we are indebted to our PartnerInstitutes whose support makes our workpossible. The rule of law, read economically, is theinstitutional condition under which privateand public actors can make long-horizondecisions, because they expect rules to beapplied predictably and fairly enough tomake investment, innovation and cooperationworthwhile. Economic competitiveness in 2026 is nolonger mainly a contest of cost or scale,or even of innovation. It is a contest ofinstitutional credibility. The more fragmentedthe world becomes, the more valuablepredictable rules, enforceable commitments,and legitimate state capacity become. The distinction that matters the most is notbetween more rules versus fewer rules.Rather, it’s between rules on paper versusrules people believe. Economies do not getcompetitive by legislating more. They getcompetitive when economic actors trust thatcontracts will be upheld, public decisions willbe reviewable, corruption will be constrained,and administrative discretion will operate Stubb –as conveyed in his 2025 and 2026public speeches, and then as cementedin his 2026 book Th