21 May 2026Concentrating Power, Dependencies, and Supply Chains Allianz Research Content Page 3-4Executive Summary Page 5-11An AI boom built in Asia Page 12-20 The growth in trade in services and data flows isaccelerating with the diffusion of AI Page 21-24The world is flat: AI reconfigures the geography oftrade and dependencies Page 25-29 The race for AI dominance is increasingly also beingfought through industrial policy SummaryExecutive AI and trade are no longer separate policy domains. AI growth depends onglobalized supply chains for semiconductors, computing infrastructure and digitalservices while trade is increasingly shaped by who controls AI infrastructure, data Jasmin GröschlSenior Economist for Europejasmin.groeschl@allianz.com •Trade openness is a structural precondition for AI-driven productivity gains.Open economies benefit disproportionately from cheaper inputs, fasterinnovation diffusion and AI adoption spillovers. Trade openness accounts for23% of the variation in AI adoption across countries with highly open economies,such as Singapore, UAE and Ireland, leading in diffusion. However, while AI can Lluis Dalmau TaulesEconomist for Africa & Middle Eastlluis.dalmau@allianz-trade.com •Export volumes of AI-enabling goods have surged from USD1trn in 2014to USD3.8trn in 2025 (+280%), accounting for 15% of global trade and faroutpacing the 40% growth in goods trade overall.Asia dominates the supplyside, accounting for 65% of global AI-related exports and seven of the top tenexporters, led by China (18% of AI-related exports), Taiwan (12%) and Hong Kong(11%). The composition remains concentrated in intermediate inputs (76%) and Maxime Darmet CucchiariniSenior Economist for UK, US & Francemaxime.darmet@allianz-trade.com Guillaume DejeanSenior Sector Advisor •Services imbalances could scale with AI.ICT services trade reached USD900bnin 2024 (11% of global services trade), with Ireland alone exporting USD173bn,exceeding both the rest of the EU (USD142bn) and the US (USD108bn), andreflecting its role as a billing hub for US multinationals. However, it masksstructural dependence, with the EU excluding Ireland running a USD45bn ICTservices deficit (mainly with Ireland), highlighting its reliance on US digitalecosystems. And things could get worse. Hypothetically, if the AI servicessubscription penetration rate of US providers such as ChatGTP Plus and Claude Maddalena MartiniSenior Economist for Southern Europe & Beneluxmaddalena.martini@allianz.com Garance TallonEconomist for Asia Pacific Romain PoncetResearch Assistant Beyond the headline data, three structural dynamics are reshaping the global AI 1.Supply chain concentration as single points of failureThe AI supply chain is concentrating rapidly at the technological frontier. Taiwan, South Korea, the US and the Netherlands dominate the production of advanced chips, high-bandwidth memory and semiconductor equipment, creating critical single points offailure with no near-term redundancy. Unlike broader goods trade, which has partiallyreoriented along geopolitical lines, AI-related goods remain largely unfragmentedacross geopolitical blocs, with semiconductors and key components still flowingglobally except at the technological frontier (notably advanced US export controls) 2.Infrastructure as geopolitical power Control over data centers, cloud infrastructure and computing capacity is emergingas a primary source of geopolitical leverage, distinct from traditional goods tradedynamics. Europe‘s strategic exposure is acute. With less than 10GW of operationaldata-center capacity, four times below the US (60GW), and a development pipeline sixtimes smaller, the gap is not expected to narrow. US hyperscalers already control 35%of European computing capacity and account for nearly half of the upcoming pipeline,consolidating a 70% cloud market share. Structural constraints, fragmented regulation,complex permitting processes, grid connection delays, no domestic hyperscaler andlimited VC or state-backed funding reinforce this dependency. Finally, reliance onAsian hardware inputs complements the US dependence that will increase without 3.Industrial policy: from subsidies to protectionism Global tariffs on AI-enabling goods have fallen from 5.6% in 2015 to 2.8% in 2025,well below the 7.8% average for manufacturing overall, but non-tariff measures havesurged, driven primarily by the US and China, reflecting a strategic shift from financialsupport toward technology protectionism. Over 3,600 AI subsidy measures targetingcritical materials, semiconductors, GPUs, computing equipment and optical fibers arenow in force globally, with China having nearly doubled its trade coverage over fiveyears, followed by South Korea, Malaysia, the US and Japan. The overlap of national An AI boom built in Asia AI fundamentally depends on global trade ingoods and services, with a complex, internationallyfragmented value chain spanning raw materials,semiconduct