私募股权收购的供应链溢出效应

The supply chain spillovers of privateequity buyouts Abstract We study how private equity (PE) buyouts propagate through supply chains using uniquefirm-to-firm transactions data from Belgium.In normal times, suppliers of PE-backedfirms outperform their peers by 5%–10% in employment and sales growth, primarily dueto increased input demand from PE-backed customers rather than knowledge spillovers orother mechanisms. In economic downturns, however, this outperformance is attenuated andsuppliers compress markups by around 8% as PE investors intensify bargaining pressureand reconfigure supply chains to extract cost savings. Beyond the direct effects on suppliers,we show that as PE-backed firms absorb supplier capacity, they crowd out competitors thatrely on the same suppliers. Overall, our findings underscore that supply chains are centralto how PE investors create and redistribute value. JEL Classification:D22, D24, G32, G34 Keywords:Private equity, Supply chains, Spillover effects, Firm growth, Switching costs,Bargaining power Non-technical summary Private equity (PE) has become a major form of ownership in modern economies, yet its economiceffects remain contested. On the one hand, proponents have argued that PE investors createvalue through operational improvements and stronger governance structures. On the other hand,critics have claimed that PE investors generate returns by redistributing surplus away from otherstakeholders—for example, through aggressive cost cutting and contract renegotiation. This debate has spurred a growing body of research on the economic implications of PEownership, focusing on how buyouts affect the outcomes of acquired firms.Yet firms do notoperate in isolation; they are embedded in complex production networks. Despite the central roleof buyer–supplier linkages as channels of economic transmission, little is known about how PEbuyouts propagate through production networks and affect the supply chain partners of PE-backedfirms. Theory offers opposing predictions. On the one hand, if PE buyouts enable targets to pursuenew growth opportunities or improve operational efficiency, suppliers may benefit from increaseddemand for inputs or knowledge spillovers. On the other hand, PE firms’ high leverage and shortinvestment horizons may lead them to exert pressure on suppliers for cost reductions—e.g., byrenegotiating contracts or switching suppliers. Our paper empirically examines these predictions using unique production network data fromBelgium—which record the buyer-supplier relationships of virtually all firms in the economy—linked to Belgian PE deals and firm balance sheet data for the period 2002–2021. Using thisunique dataset, we employ a matched difference-in-differences framework to compare the economictrajectories of suppliers with versus without PE-backed customers, after versus before PE buyouts. Our analysis yields three main findings. First, in normal times, suppliers of PE-backed firmssignificantly outperform comparable suppliers of non-PE-backed firms, with employment and salesgrowth higher by approximately 5% and 10%, respectively. These gains are primarily driven byincreased input demand from faster-growing PE-backed customers, rather than by technologytransfer or knowledge spillovers. Second, these effects are attenuated during economic downturns.In such periods, suppliers of PE-backed firms no longer outperform their peers and instead reducemarkups by around 8% due to PE investors exerting greater pressure on suppliers and moreactively reconfiguring supply chains to generate cost savings.Finally, beyond direct suppliereffects, we document crowding-out effects on firms that share suppliers with PE-backed rivals.Specifically, we show that, as PE-backed firms absorb supplier capacity, competitors that rely on the same suppliers experience significant performance declines. Overall, our study provides new insights into the role of supply chains in PE investors’ ability tocreate and redistribute value. Policymakers should consider not only the direct effects of PE buyoutsbut also their broader spillovers along production networks and the resulting implications forproduct market competition. These insights may inform antitrust evaluations of PE transactions,contribute to ongoing debates about the role of bank versus non-bank financing in fosteringeconomic growth, and guide policy discussions on supply chain resilience. I.Introduction The private equity (PE) industry has grown tremendously over the past two decades, reachingmore than $5 trillion in assets under management globally by 2024, corresponding to afour-fold increase since 2010 (Preqin 2024). This rapid growth has not been without criticism;politicians and labor unions increasingly raise concerns about the adverse impact of PEbuyouts, prompting legislative responses such as the “Stop Wall Street Looting Act” recentlyproposed by several U.S. senators. Nevertheless, a growing body of research indicates thatP