农业科技领域的“好”投资是什么样的？

EMERGING TECH RESEARCHWhat Does a “Good”Investment Look Likein Agtech? Institutional Research Group Alex FrederickLead Research Analyst,Agri-foodtechalex.frederick@pitchbook.com Caleb WilkinsData Analystpbinstitutionalresearch@pitchbook.comPublished on April 24, 2026 A realistic framework for returns, risk, and capitalallocation PitchBook is a Morningstar company providing the most comprehensive, mostaccurate, and hard-to-find data for professionals doing business in the private markets. Contents Key takeaways1Executive summary3Investment recommendation51. The VC-backed outcome universe:What the data actually shows92. Cohort survival analysis: What fractionof VC-backed agtech companies reach asuccessful exit?103. Exit values: Crop inputs and precisionag lead; most segments disappoint124. VC-backed failures: $8.2 billion inconfirmed capital destruction145. What a “good” VC-backed agtechinvestment actually looks like176. Performance by technology category:What the buckets actually show207. What separates successful agtechinvestors: Specialization, concentration,and patience26Appendix31Data notes and methodology33References36 Key takeaways •Most VC-backed outcomes are confirmed failures.Of 1,197 VC-backed agtechcompanies with known outcomes, 683 are confirmed failures (a confirmed floor,not a ceiling). An additional 372 exited without a disclosed valuation. Only 142(11.9%) have a disclosed exit value. This composition is the foundation of everyreturn expectation in the sector. The failure count is a confirmed floor; the truenumber is likely materially higher. •Segment and bucket selection are the primary return drivers.Crop inputs &enhancements leads median VC exit value at $139 million and has the second-highest top-decile exit at $887 million. Precision ag commands the highest top-decile exit of any segment at $1.4 billion, with animal ag ($588 million) rounding outthe top three segments by 90th-percentile exit size. •2015-2020 cohort: 5.4% reached $100 million or higher; 0.6% reached $1 billionor higher.Among the 2,533 VC-backed companies founded between 2015 and2020, only 152 (6%) have a confirmed exit and 345 (13.6%) are confirmed failuresas of year-end 2025; 80.4% remain active in portfolio. Of the 29 exits with disclosedvalues, nine exceeded $100 million, and one exceeded $1 billion. These rates willrise as the 80.4% still in portfolio continue to resolve. •$8.2 billion or more destroyed; known failure rate at 5.1x pre-boom baseline.VC-backed confirmed failures destroyed a known $8.2 billion in capital. The failurerate has accelerated to 5.1x the pre-boom baseline: at least 162 VC-backed failuresin 2025 alone, the highest year on record. The 2021 boom cohort is still activelyresolving. •Capital discipline and acquirer relationships define outcomes.Capital raised is thestrongest predictor of survival. Companies raising under $1 million had a minimum78% failure rate. The $15 million to $60 million range offers the best combination of survival odds and capital efficiency. A handful of serial strategic acquirers,including Zoetis, Bayer, AGCO, John Deere, and Elanco, drive a disproportionateshare of large exit value. •Investor concentration and conviction predict performance, but portfolio sizealone is not the differentiator the prior vintage of data suggested.Direct investor-level data on 14,283 investors identifies clear performance patterns. Novo Holdings(zero confirmed failures, 50% $100 million or higher rate) exemplifies th e specialist-with-patient-capital model. Khosla Ventures (zero confirmed failures, 62.5% $100million or higher rate) is a generalist fund whose agtech performance refl ects deepconviction within its agtech portfolio rather than sector specialization. Amonginvestors with five or more portfolio companies, the failure rate and $100 millionor higher hit rate are relatively consistent across portfolio sizes: Investors withfive to nine companies show a 25% average $100 million or higher rate, thosewith 10 to 19 companies show 24%, and those with 20 or more show 19%. Thedata does not support a simple “smaller is better” conclusion on portfolio size.What distinguishes top performers is not how many agtech companies they back,but whether they bring genuine domain expertise, segment focus, and acquirerrelationships to each position. Note that portfolio sizes reflect only agtech holdingsin this dataset; many investors participate in agtech as one vertical within a muchlarger cross-sector portfolio, meaning these figures do not capture their total fundexposure and risk-management context. Biochem & inputs specialists continue todominate the top-performer list. •The biochem & inputs exit market is structurally growing, not cyclical.Regulatorypressure on synthetic pesticides is accelerating the shift to biological crop inputs,with the market forecast to roughly double by 2030. Bayer, BASF, Syngenta,Novozymes, and Corteva are repeat acquirers who have publicly named biologicalsas a