2026年战略趋势：全球事务重大进展

Key Developments in Global Affairs Gorana Grgić, Daniel MöckliAndreas WengerGorana Grgić, Clémence Poirier,Gesine Weber, Ivan Zaccagnini Editors:Series Editor:Authors: STRATEGIC TRENDS 2026 is also electronically available at:www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2026: Gorana Grgić, Daniel MöckliSeries Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact:Center for Security StudiesETH ZurichHaldeneggsteig 4, IFWCH-8092 ZurichSwitzerland This publication covers events up to early March 2026. Theviews expressed in each chapter are solely those of the authorsand do not reflect the views or positions of the CSS. © 2026, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich ISSN1664-0667ISBN978-3-907691-02-1 CHAPTER 3 Emerging Technologies and theEnduring Elements of Warfare Ivan Zaccagnini The diffusion of emerging technologies on the battlefield has sparked intensedebate over whether these systems are fundamentally revolutionizingwarfare, with far-reaching strategic, operational, and tactical implications.There is evidence to suggest that such claims are premature. Rather thanundergoing a sudden revolution, the changing character of warfare is experi-encing an uneven and incremental process of evolution where steel, powder,and blood continue to be crucial. Traditional elements of warfare such asindustrial capacity and capability, conventional fires, and manpower remainindispensable in achieving victory, requiring states to balance investmentsin cutting-edge innovation with the enduring principles of conventionalmilitary power. suggests that such conclusions are,at minimum, premature. War is notexperiencing a sudden revolution butrather an ongoing and uneven processof evolution. While change is inevita-ble, so is continuity.3Alongside newtechnologies, steel, powder, and bloodcontinue to matter. In fact, traditionalelements of warfare such as industrialcapacity and capability, legacy plat-forms, conventional kinetic fires (ar-tillery, missiles, and rockets), and mil-itary personnel remain indispensablein fighting and winning wars. Over the past two decades, new tech-nologies have proliferated on the bat-tlefield, becoming a constant featureof contemporary conflicts. These tech-nologies include military and com-mercial unmanned platforms (drones),artificial intelligence (AI), cyber capa-bilities, space-based assets, and cloudcomputing, among others. Analystsand practitioners have frequently in-terpreted their ubiquity as evidence ofthe next Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA). Proponents of this view argue thatnovel technologies are fundamentallyreshaping the direction and characterof warfare, by altering the balance ofpower between offense and defense,making war and conflicts more like-ly, and ultimately enabling new op-erational and organizational models.1According to this perspective, con-temporary technologies reduce risksto human operators, facilitate actionsbelow the threshold of convention-al war, make legacy weapon systemsincreasingly obsolete, and render thebattlefield consistently transparent byproviding persistent intelligence, sur-veillance,and reconnaissance(ISR)coverage.2 This chapter applies established RMAcriteria, namely the requirement forfundamental alterations to the char-acter,doctrine,and organizationalstructure of war, to assess contem-porary developments with particularattention to recent conflicts in East-ern Europe and the Middle East. Theanalysis demonstrates that while newtechnologies and the novel adoptionand adaptation of existing platformssuch as drones function as force mul-tipliers in specific contexts, they havenot yet produced a fundamental rev-olution or discontinuity. Rather, con-temporary warfare reflects a rapid butcontinuous evolution of establishedways and means. However,empirical evidence fromboth historical and contemporary con-flicts does not substantiate the claim ofa full-fledged revolution and instead While the character of warfare is un-doubtedly undergoing an evolution,itsunderlying logic remains more one.’5 While technology and newplatforms provide the potential forchange, a “revolution” does not existuntil the military develops the novelstrategiesand organizational struc-tures necessary to utilize that technol-ogy effectively. resilientthan many contemporaryclaims suggest. The impact of newtechnologieswill be moderated bythe persistent cycle of innovation andcounter-innovation and will dependon states’ capacity to integrate them,coupled with conceptual and orga-nizational adaptation in their armedforces. States that recognize these reali-ties and invest accordingly in platformintegration, industrial readiness andresilience,and human competencewill be better positioned to competeeffectively and prevail in both contem-porary and future warfare. Historical experience cautions againstprematureclaims of revolutionarychanges. During the 1990s and early2000s, policymakers and analysts fre-quently announced the advent of aninformation-b