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Date16 March 2026 Priorities Shreyas GopalStrategist+44-20-754-51501 Almost alltheG10 central banks meet over the course of the next fortnight.Broadly speaking,monetary policy settersarein a very similar position to themarket, in having little clarityoverthe forward pathofgeopolitics andenergyprices. Nevertheless,in the context of sharp rates repricing, the meetings arethefirst major opportunity for each central bank torevealtheirpriorities, as theygrapple withan outlook ofhigher inflation outlookandweaker growth. Whiletheterms-of-trade impacthassimultaneouslybeenthe primary driver ofbothcurrencyandratesrepricingso far,from here on,we would expect anydifferences in guidance offered by central banks to start to shape relativecurrency performance moresignificantly.Below, we focusspecificallyon thecurrency implications of this Thursday’sBank of England, Swiss National BankandRiksbank meetings, as well as the NorgesBank meeting the following week(26th). While we expectrate holdsfrom them all (see oureconomist’s fullBoE econpreviewhere), thevarieddomestic backdropssuggestdifferentcentral bankpriorities, and thus differentcurrency implications for each. GBP andtheBank of England Ashighlightedlast week andupdated inFigure1below,the UK has seen by far thelargest hawkish repricing this month.Setting aside the impact of positionsquaring,in isolation this reactionsuggests the market is confident that theMPCwill do whateveris necessary to anchor inflation expectations, even in the contextof a much weaker demand and labour market starting pointheading into thissupply shock, as compared tofour years ago.Attherisk of stating the obviousthen, if the Bank were tocontinue to point to cutsthis week,itwould err firmlynegative for FXon the day. In the mediumterm,an extended conflict and higher energy prices wouldonlyfurther increase the importance–from an FX perspective–of theBank ofEnglandnot sounding dovish. This is becausethe signs increasingly point to morefiscal support, with theChancellorlast week describing the UK asnowbeingin astronger position to respond to shocks.From an FX perspective,there’s somemerit to this statement. The starting point for theUKtrade balanceheading intothis year–stripping outtrade in erratics such as precious metals-wasbetter thannormal(Figure2), while UK yields are in a more attractive starting point relative tothe external deficit and peers(Figure3andFigure4). However, the UK remains very reliant on international energymarkets.In volumeterms, the UK’s net fuel import balance is close to its record in 2013.As such,acontinued surgeinenergyprices couldultimatelyweigh to a similar degree as in2022. At its peak four years ago, the rise in energy pricesadded the equivalent of1% of GDP to the trade deficit(Figure5andFigure6).In that scenario, there wouldalso be more attention on the fiscal picture. Indeed,one negative riskfor thepound stemsfrom the fact thatboth the probability of material fiscal support,as well asits associated cost,rise together at exactly the same timethat the externalbalance worsensand the pound’s vulnerability increases-even if the startingpoint is healthieras noted above.Alltold, with theexternalshockand positioningreduction leading to ahalving of the risk premium in the pound (now c. 1%),westick withGBPshorts. Source:Deutsche Bank Research, Haver Analytics CHF and theSwiss National Bank During the previous energy shock in 2022,the SNB proactively strengthened thefranc to help curb imported inflation pressures. It is already clear that this timewill be different.The SNBhasalready stated thatthey stand more ready tointervenein curbing excess strength in the franc in light of geopoliticaluncertainty.The difference in reaction function can be explained bythe moreexpensive starting point of the franc in real terms thanin2022(Figure7), andbecause the starting point of inflation is much lower. Wewouldexpect the SNB to repeat thishigher willingness to lean against CHFstrengthin the March statement, while leaving rates on hold as unanimouslyexpected.As noted previously, we interpreted their statement as implicitlysignaling anunease for the franc to strengthen beyond the 0.90 level vs EUR,even though the central bank are likely to de-emphasise any particular levelintheircomments.Going forward, we expect more focus to fall on weekly sightdeposit data to gauge the extent to which the SNBhashad tointervene. However,we wouldcautionagainstoverinterpreting these figures. Outside of sustainedperiods of intervention, such as around Covid andwhen strengthening thecurrencyin 2022-23,the relationship between sight deposit changes andconfirmed intervention is quite weak(Figure8).We remainneutralon CHF. SEK and theRiksbank SEK's performance so far this monthis nowin line with its performance at theonset ofthe energy shock in 2022, as the market marks down the outlook foroil-importing,pro-cyclical European currencies(Figure9).Beyond the externalfactors,however, the domestic data has als