The Implicationsof Oil and Gas FieldDecline Rates INTERNATIONAL ENERGYAGENCY The IEA examines the fullspectrumof energy issuesincluding oil, gas andcoal supply anddemand, renewableenergy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand sidemanagement and muchmore. Through its work,the IEA advocatespolicies that will enhancethe reliability,affordability andsustainability of energyin its32Member countries,13Association countriesand beyond. IEAAssociationcountries: IEAMembercountries: AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaCzech RepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIrelandItalyJapanKoreaLatviaLithuaniaLuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNew ZealandNorwayPolandPortugalSlovak RepublicSpainSwedenSwitzerlandRepublic of TürkiyeUnited KingdomUnited States ArgentinaBrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaKenyaMoroccoSenegalSingaporeSouth AfricaThailandUkraine This publication and any mapincluded herein are withoutprejudice to the status of orsovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation ofinternational frontiers andboundaries and to the nameof any territory, city or area. The EuropeanCommission alsoparticipates in thework of the IEA Source: IEA.International Energy AgencyWebsite: www.iea.org Executive summary Discussions on the future of oil and gas oftenoveremphasise demand drivers and underappreciatesupply drivers Debate over the future of oil and natural gas tends to focus on the outlookfor demand, with much less consideration given to how the supply picturecould develop.This asymmetry is misplaced and a thorough understanding ofthe rate at which production from existing oil and gas fields declines over time ismore important than ever. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has longexamined this issue. Decline rates – the annual rate at which production declinesfrom an existing oil or gas field – underpin our analysis of market balances andinvestment needs across all outlook scenarios. Nearly 90% of annual upstream oil and gas investment since 2019 has beendedicated to offsetting production declines rather than to meet demandgrowth.Investment in 2025 is set to be around USD 570 billion, and if this persists,modest production growth could continue in the future. But a relatively small dropin upstream investment can mean the difference between oil and gas supplygrowth and static production. At the same time, less investment is required in ascenario in which demand contracts. A detailed look at today’s global supply picture The composition of oil and gas production has changed rapidly in recentyears with the notable rise of tight oil and shale gas. In 2000, conventional oilfields contributed 97% of total oil output globally, however, by 2024 this share hadfallen to 77% as a result of rising output from unconventional fields. In the case ofnatural gas, around 70% of the 4 300 billion cubic metres (bcm) produced todayis from conventional fields, with nearly all of the rest being shale gas produced inthe United States. Even with the shale revolution, overall oil and gas output stillrelies heavily on a small number of supergiant fields, largely in the Middle East,Eurasia and North America, which together accounted for almost half of global oiland gas production in 2024. Detailed analysis of the production records of around 15 000 oil and gasfieldsfrom around the world reveals that the global average annualobserved post-peak decline rate is 5.6% for conventional oil and 6.8% forconventional natural gas.This varies widely by field type: supergiant oil fieldsdecline by an average of 2.7% annually, while the average for small fields is more than 11.6%. Onshore oil fields decline more slowly, by an average of 4.2% peryear, than those located deep offshore at 10.3%. The Middle East, which holdsthe world’s largest conventional onshore fields, has the lowest oil observed post-peak decline rate at 1.8%, while Europe, which is has a very high share of offshorefields, exhibits the highest decline rate at 9.7%. In the absence of investment, supply falls quickly Alongside theobserved rate declinesthat are derived from field productionhistories, it is possible to estimate thenatural rate declinesthat would occurif all capital investment were to stop. These declines are even steeper. If allcapital investment in existing sources of oil and gas production were to ceaseimmediately, global oil production would fall by 8% per year on average over thenext decade, or around 5.5 million barrels per day (mb/d) each year. This isequivalent to losing more than the annual output of Brazil and Norway each year.Natural gas production would fall by an average of 9%, or 270 bcm, each year,equivalent to total natural gas production from the whole of Africa today. Natural decline rates are becoming steeper.In 2010, natural decline rateswould have led to a 3.9 mb/d annual drop in oil production and 180 bcm annualdrop in gas production. The sharper natural decline rates observed now comparedwith 2010 reflects the hig