William Blair In a higher and/or more volatile inflationary environ-ment that faces greater supply-side friction and capacityconstraints, and where inflationary expectations are notwell anchored, the primary driver of the correlation flipsfrom growth shocks to inflation shocks. In this environ-ment, inflation quickly becomes the binding constraint One of our core themes over the last few years has beenthat the inflation regime has changed following the pan-demic. It has flipped from a frictionless supply-side worldto one where friction has been introduced and inflationwill be slightly higher, on average, and more volatile thanin the past. This shift has enormous implications for economic growth, central bank policy, and investors. For equity market investors, we believe one of the key impli- cations will be a renewed focus on valuation (a shift from inflation rises, the Fed is less able to “look through” thesupply shock in the same way that it would have in theold world—it needs to sound or act more hawkishly bydelaying any planned easing; as a result, both bonds and One of the most important metrics we have been high-lighting for the last couple of years now is the correlationbetween the stock market and the bond market (exhibit1). While the correlation between the two is not set in Today, as exhibit 1 depicts, financial markets are telling usthat since 2020, the inflation regime has flipped. Previously, we lived in a hyperglobalized, frictionless,supply-side world, where labor, capital (plant, equipment,and machinery), and importantly energy (due to fracking,energy efficiencies, and renewables) were abundant. Sup- •Slower labor force growth (retiring baby boomers, aslower birth rate, a pandemic, and stringent immigra- •Capacity constraints on the availability of capital, dueto deglobalization, geopolitical and geo-economicbarriers, tariffs, increasingly erratic weather events, •Massive growth in demand for energy against supplythat is not coming online fast enough to meet that labor and capital is abundant, financial market partici-pants and central banks predominantly need to respondto growth shocks, as opposed to inflation shocks. In thisscenario, if there is a negative growth shock, equity mar-kets fall but bonds rally on the back of an expected futurerate cut. Conversely, if growth accelerates, equities rallybut bonds decline, as the central bank will be forced toraise rates to cool growth and ease inflationary pressures. In the old world, the low and stable inflation regimemeant for monetary policymakers that there was virtuallyno upside risk to inflation; it was viewed as a “high-classproblem.” As a result, the only risk from inflation wasthought to be to the downside—deflation from a poten- Richard de Chazal, CFA +44 20 7868 44892 William Blair (make sure “it” doesn’t happen here). This meant the Fedneeded to respond more quickly to downside risks by cut-ting interest rates (the Fed put) and then keeping those This frictionless supply-side world also enabled the emer-gence of forward guidance—as there was relatively littlerisk of being surprised by a supply-side shock. This inturn meant that central banks were able to provide policy In today’s world, because supply-side shocks are nowmore frequent, inflationary expectations are no longer aswell anchored. As a result, policymakers have less leewayin looking through these shocks. In effect, inflation risks For equity investors, this means a need for greater diver-sification in the form of a broader portfolio of holdingsacross the size, sector, and country spectrums. It alsomeans an increased sensitivity to valuation, and a higherequity risk premium to entice investors to take on more From a monetary policy perspective, the central banksare no longer able to respond as preemptively to down-side shocks—i.e., there is still a Fed put, but it now hasa lower strike price. In addition, they no longer havethe ability to hold those rates at lower-for-longer levels In such a world, it is more difficult for central banks to pro-vide much in the way of accurate forward guidance, giventhat there is an increased likelihood that theyget it wrong.In turn, those mistakes can have very damaging effects ontheirreputation and credibility, and can further negativelyimpact their inflation-fighting ability—as they discovered of this old low inflation/low rates regime was a nine-yearunderperformance of higher-quality stocks (2011-2020),as illustrated in exhibit 3. This was preceded by an (atleast) 16-year period of exceptionally strong outperfor- What This Means for Investors In the old world, with limited upside inflation risks,portfolio protection from bonds, a higher Fed put strikeprice, and rates lower for longer enabled, investors could extend their portfolio duration risk curve and make themless valuation sensitive. In the current world, as exhibit 1 shows, the stock-to-bond correlation has flipped, and the new positive cor-relation means t