技术战争：美国与中国在2035年前的电子产品竞争

The future of global tradeby Coface Editorial Initiated in the wake of the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s and accelerated by China’s entry intothe WTO a decade later, trade globalisation in its contemporary version was based on two promises: onepolitical, the other economic. The political promise was grounded on the virtues ofle doux commerce– gentle commerce – extolled byMontesquieu, orWandel durch Handel1in its German version two centuries later. Growing trade wouldhelp bring countries and people closer together, binding them by shared economic interests. Moreover,a certain “elective affinity” in the Weberian sense between free trade and political freedom inspired hopefor a gradual spread of the democratic form to the entire globe. According to some, the combination ofpolitical pluralism and open trade would even seal the final victory of liberal democracy over other kinds ofpolitical systems. We now know the political promise will not be kept in two respects. First, the 2020s has seen a rekindlingof major geopolitical tensions emanating along the East-West and North-South fault lines. Second, theChineseexample has categorically confirmed that authoritarianism and capitalism are potentiallycompatible. In short, le doux commercehas not prevented wars or the perpetuation of dictatorships. Furthermore, a certain impoverishment of the working and middleclasses in advanced countries has undermined the social foundationson which all democracy rests. “The intensificationof trade was supposedto contribute to bringtogether countriesand peoples, linkedby common economicinterests... We nowknow thatthis promise willnot be kept.” The second promise of globalisation was economic. It argued thatthe expansion of trade would create a trend of self-sustaininginterdependence which, barring a major catastrophe, would preventus from turning back the clock. Value chains would continue to bedesigned and deployed on a global scale, constantly adapting tothe context but always following the Ricardian logic of comparativeadvantages. The quest for profitability, the strengthening of multinationalsand the gradual widening of large, global trade zones made a return tothe past highly unlikely. This second promise has not been refuted, but it is currently moreuncertain. The share of trade in global wealth has stagnated overthe past fifteen years, and the first signs of trade flow fragmentationare emerging. This is undeniably the case for energy, with Russia’sdecoupling from the Western side of globalisation. However, it is alsooccurring in manufactured goods on back of a growing number of Jean-Christophe CaffetChief Economist export restrictions and tariff increases. In short, globalisation is not dead, it is changing. Complex, contradictory and fast-moving, these developments require more than ever impartial analysisbased on verified data and facts. Coface’s Economic Research Department provides this, working inconjunction with the experts and practitioners who took part in our Country Risk Conference in February.I would like to thank them and the entire team of Coface economists. ExecutiveSummary Few charts are as clear as the one showing the shareof trade in world GDP over the past 150 years. Afteralmost continuous and relatively regular growth sincethe immediate post-war period, it fell at the turn ofthe 2010s due to the Great Financial Crisis and therebalancing of the Chinese economic model. Sincethen,the share of world trade has not grown - nor hasit really declined, as it did between the two world wars. an open conflict between the United States and China,forexample,is hardly conceivable in the mediumterm. Nor can we rule out ‘good news’ regarding theresolution of certain ongoing conflicts. Butthe situation remains extremely fragile anduncertain, with major implications for trade, investmentdecisions and economic growth. The emergence of twodistinct world poles, centred on China and the UnitedStates, raises fears of a return to a new Cold War. It opensthe door to many unknowns, particularly with regard tothe European Union’s strategy, India’s positioning and apossible rapprochement between Russia and the UnitedStates. Divided, Europe seems particularly vulnerable tothe double threat posed by Donald Trump’s strategicagenda and the commercial aggressiveness of a Chinarelentlessly seeking new markets. Thesecond panel focused on the dynamics offragmentation in the manufacturing, financial andlogisticssectors.The four speakers, experts and/oractors in the global economy, underlined the resilienceofcertain fundamentals of globalisation to thegeopolitical shocks mentioned above. Trade remainsat a high level thanks to the support of «connector»countries. Maritime transport had a good year in 2024,despite (or because of) the disruption of the maintrade routes (Suez, Panama, etc.). Finally, internationalfinancial flows do not seem to have been fundamentallyaffected (yet?), even if the sanctions regimes make thestr