稳定币与代币化存款：重新审视狭义的银行业争论（英）

Xuesong Huang|Todd Keister Stablecoins vs. Tokenized Deposits: The Narrow Banking Debate RevisitedXuesong Huang and Todd Keister Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no.1179February2026https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1179 Abstract We study how the type of money used in blockchain-based trade affects interest rates, investment,andwelfare. Stablecoins in our model are backed by safe assets, while banks issuedeposits (both traditionaland tokenized) to fund a portfolio of safe and risky assets. Depositinsurance creates a risk-shiftingincentive for banks, and regulation increases banks’ costs. Ifregulatory costs are large and risk-shifting islimited, we show that allowing only tokenizeddeposits to be used in crypto trade raises welfare byexpanding bank credit. If regulationis lighter and the risk-shifting incentive is strong, in contrast,allowing only stablecoins isdesirable despite crowding out credit. In between these cases, allowingstablecoins and tokenizeddeposits to compete is optimal. The tradeoffs between these policies arereminiscentof both historical and recent debates over the desirability of narrow banking. JEL classification:E42, G21, G28Keywords:stablecoins, money creation; narrow banking, bank regulation This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interestedreaders solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author(s) and do not necessarily reflect theposition of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or theFederal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s). 1Introduction As blockchain-based economic activity has developed in recent years, demand has grownfor a blockchain-native or “tokenized” form of money denominated in a traditional unit ofaccount, especially the U.S. dollar. A number of so-called stablecoins have emerged to playthis role, and the market capitalization of these stablecoins exceeded$300 billion in November2025.The rise of this new form of money has sparked a debate about how it should becreated. What type of entities should issue tokenized money, and what assets should backtheir liabilities?We examine these questions using a dynamic general equilibrium modelof money and exchange that highlights similarities between this current policy issue andhistorical debates in money and banking. Some people argue that the new, tokenized money should be issued by specialized inter-mediaries and backed 100% by cash and short-term government bonds.For example, JonCunliffe, then Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, said “stablecoins will need to bebacked with high quality and liquid assets . . . [such as] deposits at the Bank of England orvery highly liquid securities” (Cunliffe, 2023). Others argue that the demand for tokenizedmoney should instead be met by commercial banks.Banks could issue a tokenized formof deposits to fund a portfolio of loans and securities in much the same way as they dowith traditional bank deposits. Proponents of this view emphasize that banks promote theflow of credit in a way that stablecoins do not.Garratt et al. (2022), for example, arguethat tokenized deposits are a better solution because they “support bank lending to the realeconomy and the transmission of monetary policy.” While the demand for blockchain-native money is new, the debate about how moneyshould be created and what assets should back the supply of money has a long history. Thecomparison between stablecoins and tokenized bank deposits is, in many ways, a modernversion of the narrow-banking debate.The argument that tokenized money should be re-quired to take the form of stablecoins that are backed 100% by cash-like reserves resemblesthe Chicago Plan for banking reform of the 1930s, which advocated separating money fromthe process of credit creation.1This idea gained traction again following the global financialcrisis of 2008; see, for example, Chamley et al. (2012) and Pennacchi (2012). Opponents ofa narrow-banking requirement have argued that it would disrupt the flow of credit in theeconomy. They often advocate for focusing instead on policies that ensure the safety of bankdeposits, including reforms to bank regulation and deposit insurance. Current arguments infavor of allowing banks to issue tokenized deposits echo this view. Arguments that tokenized money should be createdonlyby traditional, credit-grantingbanks have a more recent parallel. In 2015, the Safe Deposit Bank of Norway (SDBN) beganaccepting deposits from customers and holding 100% cash reserves at the Norges Bank,Norway’s central bank.In 2021, however, the Norges Bank announced that full reservebanks will no longer to allowed to hold accounts with it (Norges Bank, 2022, Section 8.2),and SDBN ceased operation. In the U.S., a state-chartered bank called TNB (“The NarrowBank”) aimed to use a similar business model, but its request for a master account atthe Federal Reserve was deni