PQ.05 5G漫游用例的后量子密码学

Security Classification:Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the personspermitted by the securityclassification. This document is subject tocopyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not bedisclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part,to persons other than thosepermitted under the securityclassification withoutthe prior written approval of the Association. Copyright Notice Copyright ©2025GSM Association Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to anddoes not acceptany responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document.The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice. Compliance Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy. GSM AssociationNon-confidentialPQ.05Official DocumentPost Quantum Cryptography for 5G Roaming use case Table of Contents 1Introduction 1.1Overview1.2Scope1.3Abbreviations.1.4References 4446 2Executive Summary2.1Migration Plan2.2Migration Prioritization 3.13GPP Standards103.2GSMA Recommendations & Guidelines10 4Roaming Use-cases114.15G Roaming Architecture114.1.1Direct TLS114.1.2Protocol for N32 Interconnect Security (PRINS)114.1.3Inter-PLMN User Plane Security124.24G Roaming12VoNR / VoLTE Roaming13 5Scope155.1Sensitive Data Discovery155.1.15G Roaming155.1.24G Roaming16VoNR / VoLTE Roaming165.2Cryptographic Inventory175.3Threats and Attacks against Roaming Interfaces17 6Migration Strategy Analysis and Dependencies 6.1Standards196.1.1Public Key Infrastructure & Certificate Management (Not just a QSCissue)196.1.2TLS 1.3206.1.3IKEv2 / IPSec206.1.4Hybrid Cryptography206.2Regulations & Migration Strategy with Roaming Partners206.2.1National Guidelines: Regulation (Intra-PLMN) and Inter-PLMN206.2.2Vendors206.2.3Operators216.2.43rd-parties (e.g. IPX providers)216.2.5LEAs216.2.6Performance216.2.7Gantt Chart for PQC Migration226.2.8PQC Migration Process Description226.2.9Synergy with Internal Programs23 GSM AssociationNon-confidentialPQ.05Official DocumentPost Quantum Cryptography for 5G Roaming use case 6.2.10Synergy with External Programs23A.1Document History24A.2Other Information24 GSM AssociationNon-confidentialPQ.05Official DocumentPost Quantum Cryptography for 5G Roaming use case 1Introduction The GSMA PQTN Task Force has published a series of documents about the impact of PostQuantum Cryptography (PQC) on telecoms. This document is an extension ofPQ.03 v2-Quantum Safe User Cases and Migration [1]and address 4G and 5Gtheroaming. 1.1Overview 3GPP and GSMAhavedevelopeda standardisedroaming architecture, specifications andrequirements for use-cases wherea UE roams fromitsHome PLMN (HPLMN) to a VisitedPLMN (VPLMN) and vice-versa. This document provides an overview of threats, impacts andmitigation mechanisms against a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC)targeting the roaming architecture anditsinterfaces. 1.2Scope This document covers mechanisms that may be employed to protect UEs and operatornetworks fromaCRQC when a UE roams between HPLMN and VPLMN and connects to thevisitor network. The roaming architecture considers the scenarios where a Security EdgeProtection Proxy (SEPP) is responsible for protecting the operator’s core network from attackstargeting(ororiginating from)the inter-connect interfaces (N32-c, N32-f). The interfaces maybe secured using either: 1.Direct TLS between SEPPs2.PRotocol for N32 INterconnect Security (PRINS) Diameter inter-connect securityis included inthe analysis:when a 5G UE connects to a 4Groaming network and vice-versa. 1.3Abbreviations. 1.4References GSM AssociationNon-confidentialPQ.05Official DocumentPost Quantum Cryptography for 5G Roaming use case 2Executive Summary 2.1Migration Plan A threat actor may use aCRQCwhen available, to decrypt messages transported betweenmobile operators when a UE roams. The attacker may be an un-authorized Man-in-the-Middle(MITM) ora compromisedentity with access to the roaming intermediaries thatcanharvestthemessages(e.g.IPX providers).Since the messages carry subscriber information(including session keys, profile, call data, CDRs, etc.)data leakagemay impact the privacy ofsubscribers.Internal network function deployment and identifiers may be exposed toattackers, which can be used to perform secondary attacks (e.g. DoS).Networks shouldprotect the roaming interfaces using PQC-compliant key encapsulation mechanisms (e.g. ML-KEM[15]) in order that the interfaces remain protected both from classical as well as fromCRQC. Impersonation, spoofing and tampering attacks on the roaming interface may cause servicedegradation, stealing of services an