非地面网络的后量子密码学（PQ.07）

Non-confidential Post QuantumCryptography forNon-Terrestrial NetworksVersion 1.004 February 2026 Security Classification:Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the personspermitted by the securityclassification. This document is subject tocopyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not bedisclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part,to persons other than thosepermitted under the securityclassification withoutthe prior written approval of the Association. Copyright Notice Copyright ©2026GSM Association Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to anddoes not acceptany responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document.The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice. Compliance Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy. GSM AssociationNon-confidentialOfficial DocumentPost QuantumCryptography for Non-Terrestrial Networks Table of Contents 1Introduction1.3Definitions1.4Abbreviations1.5References 334 2.1Satellite to Ground72.1.1Satellite Connections as Transport Network72.1.2Satellite Connections as Transport Network for LTE Backhaul102.2.1Direct-to-Phone102.2.2Satellite IoT Connection11 3.1Sensitive Data Discovery143.2Cryptographic Inventory153.3Migration Strategy Analysis and Dependencies163.4Stakeholders163.5PKI Implications173.6Legacy Impact183.7Potential Actions / Dependencies183.8Dependencies193.8.1Standards193.8.2National Guidelines193.8.3Vendors193.8.43rd-parties203.8.5Performance203.9Gantt Chart for PQC Migration223.10PQC Migration Process Description223.11Synergy with Internal Programs233.12Synergy with External Programs23 GSM AssociationOfficial DocumentPost QuantumCryptography for Non-Terrestrial Networks 1Introduction Asthe telecommunications landscape expands beyond traditional ground-basedinfrastructure, non-terrestrial networks (NTNs) are poised to play a pivotal role in globalconnectivity.This document explores the implications of PQC implementation in NTN,providinginsight into system context,technical challenges,standards implications andmigration considerations. This document addsto the use cases covered in PQ.03 PostQuantum Cryptography–Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases v2.0 [03] 1.3Definitions The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”,“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” inthis document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [5] [6] when, and only when,they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 1.4Abbreviations 1.5References 2NTN Use-cases Non-Terrestrial Networks (NTNs), particularly satellite-based systems, present unique securitychallenges that require a distinct approachcompared totraditional 5G security measures.[5]NTNsoperate in dynamic and resource-constrained environments, with satellites and groundcomponents from diverse manufacturers, leading to incongruent security practices andvulnerabilities[8].Thelack ofmaturity of on-orbit reprogramming technologies and limitedonboard processing capabilities make NTNs susceptible to sophisticated attacks, includingjamming, eavesdropping, and unauthorized access to satellite control systems[4].Thewidegeographic coverage of NTNs exacerbates challenges such as managing secure handovers,routing in dynamic topologies, and key distribution. The 3GPP architecture for NTNdescribes two implementation scenarios:transparentpayload and regenerative payload.There are then sixmoredetailedscenarios dependingonthe satelliteorbit.[10] •"Atransparent payload:Radio Frequency filtering,Frequency conversion andamplification. Hence, the waveform signal repeated by the payload is un-changed;•-A regenerative payload:Radio Frequency filtering,Frequency conversion andamplification as well as demodulation/decoding, switch and/or routing, coding/modulation. This is effectively equivalent to having all or part of base station functions (e.g. gNB) onboard the satellite (or UAS platform)."[10] Many commercial NTN implementations such as those focused on end-user connectivity suchas broadband services continue to rely on traditional application-layer protocols like TCP/IPfor data deliverygiven that early and large-scale NTN investments were driven by the goal ofproviding global internet access. Satellite constraints such as high latency and bit error rates impact the performance ofcommunicationsprotocols,requiringadaptive and lightweight security mechanisms to protectuser plane traffic without degrading service quality.Some OEMs use lightweight cryptography,whichshould be assessed in PQC planning.should be assessed in PQC planning.