押注非银行机构（英）2026

Banking on Nonbanks Bruno Albuquerque, Eugenio Cerutti, Melih Firat, and BenediktKagerer WP/26/23 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2026FEB IMF Working Paper Banking onNonbanks*Prepared by Bruno Albuquerque†, Eugenio Cerutti‡, Melih Firat§, and Benedikt Kagerer¶ Authorized for distribution by Daria ZakharovaFebruary 2026 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:We study how banking groups adjust corporate credit supply in response to tighter macroprudentialpolicies. Using granular data on syndicated corporate loans, we show that banking groups reallocate lendingfrom bank subsidiaries toward affiliated nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) following regulatory tightening.Relative to bank subsidiaries within the same group, NBFI subsidiaries expand lending, and their credit supplyalso increases in absolute terms. We estimate that by ‘banking on’ their nonbanks, banking groups offset, onaverage, more than half of the contraction in bank lending induced by macroprudential tightening. Our findingshighlight an important intra-group reallocation channel through which banking groups can partially offsetregulatory constraints and result in greater bank–nonbank interconnectedness. 1Introduction The tightening of bank regulation following the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) coincidedwith a rapid expansion of Nonbank Financial Institutions (NBFIs).1Over the same period,macroprudential policy (MaPP) measures aimed at curbing excessive credit growth were widelyimplemented across countries. A defining feature of modern financial systems, however, is thatmany banks operate within complex groups that include both regulated bank subsidiaries andless regulated nonbank affiliates. This raises a natural question: how do banking groups adjusttheir credit supply when bank-level regulatory constraints tighten? While MaPP measures are designed to strengthen financial stability, and mitigate systemicrisk, they may also induce shifts in lending activity across the regulatory perimeter.Non-banks—comprising non-deposit-taking financial intermediaries such as broker-dealers, invest-ment funds, asset managers, pension funds, and insurance companies—are typically subjectto lighter prudential oversight than banks and, in some cases, remain outside the regulatoryperimeter altogether.This regulatory asymmetry likely contributed to the expansion of theNBFI sector during periods of intensified regulatory pressure on banks.By 2024, NBFIs ac-counted for about 51 percent of global financial assets, up from 43 percent in 2008 (FinancialStability Board 2025).Although this trend is most prominent in advanced economies (AEs),nonbank intermediation has also become increasingly important in several emerging marketand developing economies (EMDEs)—see IMF (2025a). In the global syndicated loan market,nonbanks originated roughly 50 percent of loans to nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) in 2024,compared with about 30 percent during the GFC (Albuquerque et al. 2025).2The expansionof NBFIs has translated into greater interconnectedness between banks and nonbanks, withbanks gradually increasing their exposures to nonbanks since the GFC (Krainer et al. 2024,Albuquerque et al. 2025, IMF 2025b, Schnabel 2025). In this paper, we focus on a largely unexplored dimension of bank–nonbank interconnected-ness: the role of parent banks in channeling credit to NFCs through their nonbank affiliates.3Figure 1 illustrates a marked increase in the share of NBFI subsidiaries in total banking-grouplending in the global syndicated loan market since the GFC. Although lending through both bank and nonbank subsidiaries has expanded over time, the growth of NBFI lending has beenparticularly strong, rising from about 24 percent of banking group lending around 2010 toroughly 32 percent in 2024. This increase is driven primarily by domestic NBFI subsidiaries,with foreign NBFI subsidiaries accounting for a small share of total lending. The trend is espe-cially pronounced in the United States, where NBFI subsidiaries account for more than half ofsyndicated lending by U.S. banking groups (Figure A.2 in Appendix A).4 Against this background, we examine whether the rise in bank-owned NBFI lending reflectsa response to tighter bank regulation—a question that has not yet been explored.A largeliterature shows that parent banks often offset domestic regulatory tightening by reallocatinglending across borders through foreign bank subsidiaries that are subject to host-country ru