印度深度科技创业生态中企业风险投资的战略必要性

The Strategic Imperative ofCORPORATE VENTURE CAPITALin Indian DeepTech Startup Ecosystem Introduction05 Current State of India’s Tech Startup Funding Landscape06 The Ecosystem’s Pain Points Requiring CVC Intervention09 The CVC Evolution: From Passive Investor toActive System Integrators 13 Critical CVC Execution Risks in the Indian Context16 Framework for Strategic Innovation18 Analyst’s Perspective21 Glossary of Terms22 The Indian technology ecosystem stands at a critical juncture. Contrary to the headlinefunding figures, which suggest a somewhat stable, maturing market, the gap betweenthe well-funded, software-driven startup economy and the capital-starved, strategicallyvital DeepTech sector is widening. Many conventional VCs, with their focus on rapid,scalable growth, are structurally not so well equipped to bridge what experts call the“commercialization valley of death”, which refers to the critical gap between initial researchand market success which often stems from a severe lack of funding, market demand, orstrategic support, preventing startups from scaling and becoming profitable. As a result,Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) model is evolving to fill this void. Successful CVCs aregoing beyond investments to connecting raw innovation within startups with industrial scale,domain expertise, and global market access available with big corporations. However, this transformation continues to get fundamentally challenged by systemic issueslike inertia within some established corporations and lack of agility required for startupsuccess, among others. This point of view aims to leverage insights from a recent roundtableconstituted by industry leaders from some of the top tech services companies, GlobalCapability Centers¹ (GCCs), and startups in India to provide a granular, actionable roadmapfor navigating the immense opportunities and substantial risks that lie ahead. CURRENT STATE OF INDIA’STECH STARTUP FUNDINGLANDSCAPE State of Funding Flow Into the Indian Tech Startups The sharp drop in investments from the peak of CY2021-22 continued through CY2023, anddid not show enough positive signs even in CY2024. This correction was driven by globalmacroeconomic headwinds, rising interest rates, and a significant shift in investor focus awayfrom growth at all costs towards sustainable profitability and sound unit economics. Thiscautious environment has had a profound impact on the funding landscape, especially forcapital-intensive sectors. The narrative of a recovering funding in Indian DeepTech startups is not entirely valid. Inreality, this space is witnessing bifurcation, wherein even though some capital is flowing, butit is flowing along paths of least resistance. The primary obstacle is the “commercializationvalley of death”, which can form because of multiple reasons – poor business validation of astartup’s offering, clients’ expectations from very early-stage startups to offer factory-gradereliability, supply chain lock-ins, etc. However, this is often a result of a misalignment betweenthe financial needs of Indian DeepTech ventures and the operating model of traditional VCs.Here is where this incompatibility stems from: •VC Fund Metrics:A VC fund’s success is measured by its Internal Rate of Return¹ (IRR)and Distributed to Paid-in Capital¹ (DPI). These metrics are time-sensitive. A 5–7-year pathto a meaningful exit, which is typical for DeepTech startups, substantially lowers the IRRcompared to a 3-5-year exit for a SaaS startup, even if the final cash-on-cash return issimilar. Financial models show that extending the time to exit from 5 to 7 years, even withthe same ultimate cash multiple, can reduce the annualized IRR by as much as 25-30%.The delayed return profile also harms DPI, which is a key metric for raising the next fund.A DeepTech investment, therefore, is perceived as a direct threat to a VC’s own fundraisingviability despite its potential to create long-term value for the investor, nation, and societyat large. •The Asset-Light Business Bias:Many of the most successful VC investments of the lastdecade have been in asset-light software businesses with near-zero marginal costs. Thismodel breaks when a startup needs bigger amounts for Capital Expenditure (CapEx)¹(for example, $10 Mn needed for a fabless semiconductor tape-out or a pilot biotech manufacturing plant). This CapEx is considered a red flag by many VCs as it reducescapital efficiency and introduces physical asset risks that many of them are not equippedto manage. •Market Capture vs. Market Creation:As a VC at the roundtable pointed out, many VCsare experts at funding startups that can capture a share of a known, multi-billion-dollarmarket. Their due diligence relies on quantifiable market data (TAM/SAM/SOM)¹. Deeptech startups often create entirely new categories, which makes their market sizetheoretical. For a VC’s investment committee, which relies on financial models, this is anunquantifiable black box risk that is