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谨慎对待：国内债务重组的收益和成本

2025-09-12国际货币基金组织任***

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本文研究了新兴市场和发展中国家（EMDEs）中主权国内债务重组（DDRs）的成因及其对宏观经济和财政的影响。研究发现：

DDRs 的发生因素：DDRs 更可能发生在金融体系较弱、财政规则执行严格、面临财政危机（尤其是外部违约和市场准入丧失）、经济衰退（负产出缺口）以及公共债务和利息支付占 GDP 比率上升的国家。金融发展程度与 DDRs 的发生概率呈负相关，即金融体系越不发达，发生 DDRs 的可能性越大。
DDRs 的财政影响：DDRs 可以显著降低公共债务和利息支付，但其效果不如外部债务重组（EDRs）。在五年内，DDRs 使公共债务占 GDP 比率平均下降 7.9 个百分点，远低于 EDRs（私人债权人 20.2 个百分点，官方债权人 20.7 个百分点）。
DDRs 的经济影响：与 EDRs 相比，DDRs 对产出和国内信贷的影响更大，持续时间更长。五年后，DDRs 使 GDP 下降 3.7 个百分点，国内信贷下降 1.9 个百分点，而 EDRs 的影响相对较小或甚至为正。
DDRs 的影响差异：
- 低收入国家（LICs）与新兴市场（EMs）：LICs 的 DDRs 可以带来更大的财政缓解和更温和的经济成本，而 EMs 则面临更严重的经济收缩、更长的信贷紧缩和更低的财政缓解。
- 重组设计和工具：面值削减最大化债务减免，但经济成本最高；期限延长提供更温和的财政收益，经济成本相对较低；利率削减有效降低利息和债务负担，但可能导致国内信贷大幅收缩；违约后重组和银行贷款重谈造成最严重的宏观经济金融冲击。
- 主权-银行联系：主权-银行联系越强，DDRs 导致的公共债务和利息支付下降越明显，但同时也伴随着更严重的经济收缩和国内信贷下降。
- 财政政策立场：DDRs 与财政紧缩相结合可以带来更深的债务和利息支付下降，但经济成本也更高。
- 金融发展程度：金融发展程度越高，DDRs 导致的公共债务和利息支付下降越不明显，但经济成本越高（GDP 下降更严重，国内信贷下降更多）；金融发展程度较低的国家，DDRs 可以带来更大的财政缓解，且不会产生中期经济成本。
缓解因素：国际储备和 IMF 支持计划可以缓解 DDR 的经济成本，同时保持其财政收益。国际储备较高的国家或在进行 IMF 支持计划下的 DDRs，其经济收缩较小，财政缓解较大。

本文强调，DDRs 虽然可以降低债务和利息支付，但其经济成本显著且持久，尤其是在金融体系发达、主权-银行联系紧密的国家。因此，DDRs 的实施需要谨慎设计，以最小化对金融体系的冲击，并结合良好的财政和货币政策，以确保债务可持续性，同时维护经济增长和金融稳定。

Tread with Care: Benefits and Jean-Marc Atsebi and Jeta Menkulasi WP/25/179 progress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are 2025SEP IMF Working PaperFiscal Affairs Department Tread with Care: Benefitsand Costsof Domestic Debt Restructurings Authorized for distribution byNikolay Gueorguiev IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the ABSTRACT:With increasing debt vulnerabilities, domestic debt may become an important—though stilldistinct––part of debt restructurings. This paper aims to contribute to the discourse by examining the factorsthat precipitate domestic debt restructurings (DDRs) and their implications for macro-fiscal outcomes. We findthat: (i) DDRs are less effective than external debt restructurings (EDRs) in reducing public debt and interestpayments; and (ii) they entail deeper, more persistent costs to output and domestic credit. Still, well-designed RECOMMENDED CITATION:Atsebi, J., Menkulasi, J. (2025). Tread with Care: Benefits and Costs ofDomestic Debt Restructurings. IMF Working Paper, WP/25/179. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. WORKING PAPERS Tread with Care:Benefitsand Prepared byJean-Marc Atsebi and Jeta Menkulasi Contents I.Introduction......................................................................................................................................................6 1.Data............................................................................................................................................................82.Stylized Facts.............................................................................................................................................9 1.Dealing with the Endogeneity of Debt Restructurings..............................................................................102.Local Projections......................................................................................................................................113.The AIPW Estimator.................................................................................................................................12 IV.Main Results................................................................................................................................................14 1.Logit Estimates: The likelihood of DDRs..................................................................................................142.CBPS Estimates: Covariate Balancing Scores........................................................................................153.The ATE impacts of Debt Restructurings on Public Debt, Interest Payments, GDP, andDomestic Credit............................................................................................................................................15 V.Robustness Checks.....................................................................................................................................19 1.Keeping Countries with at Least One Type of Debt Restructurings.........................................................192.Focusing on DDRs with Only Resident Creditors and Excluding Deposit-Only DDRs............................193.Alternative Maximum Weights Set in the Treatment Models...................................................................204.Using Logit to Predict Propensity Scores.................................................................................................20 1.LICs vs. EMs............................................................................................................................................212.Design and Instruments of DDRs.............................................................................................................213.Conditional on the Degree of Sovereign-Bank Nexus..............................................................................224.Conditional on Fiscal Policy Stance.........................................................................................................23 VII.Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................24Annex I. List of Countries.................................................................................................................................26Annex II. List of DDRs.......................................................................................................................................27Annex III. Figures..............................................................................................................................................29Annex IV.Tables........................................................................................

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