偿付能力作为紧急流动性支持的要求

Solvency as a requirement foremergency liquidity support Jay Rappaport and Rastko Vrbaski FSI Briefs are written by staff members of the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the Bank for InternationalSettlements (BIS), sometimes in cooperation with other experts. They are short notes on regulatory andsupervisory subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in thispublication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the BIS, its member centralbanks or the Basel-based standard-setting bodies. Furthermore, the views expressed in this publication donot reflect the views of the authors’ employers or firms. Authorised by the Chair of the FSI, Fernando Restoy. This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). To contact the BIS Media and PublicRelationsteam,pleaseemailmedia@bis.org.Youcansignupforemailalertsatwww.bis.org/emailalerts.htm. ©Bank for International Settlements 2025. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced ortranslated provided the source is stated. Solvency as a requirement for emergency liquidity support1 Highlights •Most central banks require firms to which they lend to be solvent. This applies also for emergencyliquidity support.•In all jurisdictions surveyed in this paper, the solvency concept applied for emergency liquiditysupport purposes considers broadly a firm's capacity to meet its financial obligations. However,approaches differ in the extent to which they focus on a snapshot of a firm's balance sheet or on ageneral, possibly forward-looking, assessment of viability.•As a matter of principle, the forward-looking assessment of viability for the purposes of emergencyliquidity support should be consistent with the forward-looking assessment of a firm's likelihood tofail for the purposes of resolution. This calls for close coordination between central banks,supervisors and resolution authorities when dealing with weak banks under their respectiveresponsibilities.•A certain degree of ambiguity in applying these conditions is inevitable and may help to increaseauthorities' flexibility and optionality in times of distress. 1.Introduction Central banks act as lenders of last resort to markets or individual firms. To that end, central banks havedeveloped their toolkits to include various forms of liquidity support.2 The banking turmoil of 2023confirmed the importance of liquidity support provided by central banks in times of distress. Somelegislatures are considering amending or expanding central bank mandates to allow them to provideliquidity support when financial markets are distressed.3 The post-turmoil analyses of authorities' tools and approaches have largely focused on lessonsfor supervisory effectiveness, liquidity regulation, and central banks' operational preparedness.4 A keyprecondition to any lending by a central bank is that the recipient firm be solvent. This has receivedcomparatively little attention, although it is generally recognised as a "fundamental constraint" of centralbank lending.5 Yet the precondition can raise difficulties in two respects. First, when markets aredistressed, whether or not a specific firm is factually solvent may be in doubt. Second, given that auniversally accepted definition of solvency does not exist, the very concept of solvency may be fluid. This FSI Brief seeks to contribute to the policy debate on emergency liquidity provision bybenchmarking how jurisdictions approach the solvency requirement. Our analysis focuses strictly on theconcept of solvency. Other features, such as eligible collateral, available tenors, pricing and interest, are equally relevant features of emergency liquidity provision, but they are outside the scope of this paper.Dimensions to compare include the definition of solvency, such as the extent to which forward-lookingassessments play a role; the coordination of central banks as lenders of last resort with supervisoryauthorities and/or national treasuries; and how jurisdictions approach the inevitable overlap betweenemergency liquidity provision with resolution frameworks designed to manage crises and failures. While previous studies have considered some differences in solvency definitions across a fewjurisdictions,6 this FSI Brief seeks to expand the scope of analysis by surveying policies across sevenjurisdictions and benchmarks how they implement the solvency requirement. Section 2 reviews thetheoretical rationale for requiring firms be solvent to borrow from central banks, highlights someexperiences from the 2023 banking turmoil and samples the lending frameworks that this paper discusses.Section 3 contrasts how several jurisdictions define and determine solvency as a condition for firms toreceive liquidity support at times of distress. The last section seeks to draw some conclusions and offerpolicy reflections. 2.Emergency liquidity provision and the solvency requirement 2.1The rationale of the solvency requirement A