操纵分数：公共采购拍卖中通过操纵评分规则的腐败

Rigging the Scores Corruption through Scoring Rule Manipulationin Public Procurement AuctionsPublic Disclosure Authorized Development EconomicsDevelopment Impact GroupDecember 2025 A verified reproducibility package for this paper isavailable athttp://reproducibility.worldbank.org,clickherefor direct access. Policy Research Working Paper11267 Abstract Public procurement is highly susceptible to corruption,especially in developing countries. Although open auc-tions are widely adopted to curb it, this paper finds thatcorruption remains prevalent even within this procurementformat. Procurement officers can collaborate with firms tomanipulate scoring rules, ensuring predetermined winners,while corrupt firms submit noncompetitive bids to meetminimum bidder requirements. Using extensive data fromChinese public procurement auctions, the paper introducesmodel-driven statistical tools to detect such corruption,identifying a corruption rate of 65 percent. A procurementexpert audit survey confirms the tools’ reliability, with a 91 percent probability that experts recognize suspicious scoringrules when flagged. Firm-level analysis reveals that local,state-owned, and less productive firms are favored in cor-rupt auctions. Lastly, the paper explores policy implications.Analysis of the national anti-corruption campaign since2012 suggests that general investigations may be insuffi-cient to address deeply ingrained corrupt practices. Usingcounterfactuals based on an estimated structural model, thepaper shows that implementing anonymous call-for-ten-der evaluations could improve social welfare by 10 percentby eliminating suspicious rules and encouraging broaderparticipation. This paper is a product of the Development Impact Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by theWorld Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions aroundthe world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authormay be contacted at qianmiao@worldbank.org. A verified reproducibility package for this paper is available athttp://reproducibility.worldbank.org, clickherefor direct access. The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about developmentissues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry thenames of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely thoseof the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank andits affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. RiggingtheScores:CorruptionthroughScoringRuleManipulationinPublicProcurementAuctions QianmiaoChen(Michelle)∗§†‡ Keywords: Public Procurement, Open Scoring Auction, Corruption JEL classification:H57, D73, D44, L44 ∗Research Economist, World Bank DECDI. Email: qianmiao@worldbank.org†I would like to thank Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Steve Tadelis, Kei Kawai, and Fred Finan for their advice,guidance, and support. I also thank Betty Sadoulet, Cailin Slattery, Daniel Rogger, Edward Miguel, EthanLigon, Francesco Trebbi, Jed Silver, Joel Ferguson, Juan Ortner, Karl Schurter, Kirill Borusyak, ThiagoScot, and Guo Xu, as well as numerous seminar participants at NEUDC, DevPEC, IIOC, and Conferenceon Auctions and Firms. Zan Song, Yuning Xue, and Tiffany Liu provided excellent research assistance.‡The previous version was circulated under the title “Corruption in Public Procurement Auctions: Evi- dence from Collusion between Officers and Firms”.§The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those ofthe Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. 1Introduction Corruption is a pervasive issue that undermines governments worldwide, distorting markets,stalling economic growth, and eroding public trust. Public procurement is especially vulner-able, with bribes in this sector accounting for a significant share of total corruption (OECD,2016).Corruption in procurement involves illicit practices to manipulate contract awardsfor goods, services, and works, resulting in inflated costs and placing undue burdens on tax-payers and businesses.This challenge is particularly acute in developing countries, whereweak institutional frameworks and inadequate accountability exacerbate the problem. In response to these challenges, many countries have adopted open tendering systems,following the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement,1with open scoring auctionsbeing one of the most prevalent methods. In these au