国家主管当局对不太重要的受监管实体持有的不良风险敞口的监管方法

GUIDELINE (EU) [YYYY/[XX**]] OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of [date Month YYYY] on the supervisory approach by national competent authorities to coverage of non-performingexposures held by less significant supervised entities([ECB/YYYY/XX]) THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks onthe European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions1,and in particular Article 6(1), and Article 6(5), points (a) and (c), thereof, Whereas: (1)The European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of theSingle Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). It oversees the functioning of the system and ensures theconsistent application of high supervisory standards and the consistency of supervisory outcomesacross the participating Member States. The ECB may issue guidelines to national competentauthorities (NCAs), in accordance with which supervisory tasks are to be performed and supervisorydecisions are to be adopted by NCAs. (2)The ECB ensures the consistent application of prudential requirements for credit institutions withinthe participating Member States, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 and Regulation(EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/17)2.(3)While NCAs are primarily responsible for reviewing the arrangements, processes, mechanisms andstrategies implemented by credit institutions that are classified as less significant to ensure a soundmanagement and coverage of their risks – including their provisioning policies and treatment ofassets in terms of own funds requirements – the ECB, in its oversight role within the SSM, shouldpromote the consistent application of high supervisory standards in the execution of such reviews.In this context, a consistent application of high supervisory standards to the supervisory review ofmanagement and coverage of non-performing exposures (NPEs) for less significant supervised entities across the SSM contributes to the broader objectives of ensuring that: (a) a coherent andeffective prudential supervisory approach is implemented with respect to all credit institutions in theparticipating Member States; (b) the single rulebook for financial services is applied consistently toall credit institutions in the participating Member States; and (c) all creditinstitutions in theparticipating Member States are subject to supervision of the highest quality. (4)Ensuring adequate management and coverage of NPEs has been an important priority within theSSM since its inception. The ECB has followed a supervisory approach to NPEs based on theframework devised by the Union legislator, and taking into account the interpretative guidelinesadopted by the European Banking Authority. As part of this supervisory approach, the ECB hascommunicated supervisory coverage expectations for NPEs held by significant supervised entities.Those expectations refer to NPEs where the exposure was originated prior to 26 April 2019 andwhich are therefore not subject to the deduction requirement under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 ofthe European Parliament and of the Council3. For less significant supervised entities, coverage ofsuch NPEs has to date not been subject to uniform supervisory practices across the SSM. Coverageof NPEs has been subject to the approaches defined by NCAs for their respective supervisoryactivities. (5)As shown by the experience gained by the ECB in the context of the supervisory approach followedwith respect to significant supervised entities, sufficient and timely coverage of NPEs promotes pro-active management of those exposures, the reduction of their stock, and provisioning levels that arecommensurate with the risks associated with their vintage and the evolution of recoverable amounts. (6)Therefore, the supervisory approach of NCAs in relation to coverage of NPEs held by less significantsupervised entities should cover the review of provisioning policies and treatment of assets in termsof own funds requirements of those supervised entities. (7)Such a supervisory approach to coverage of NPEs is considered to be an effective tool to mitigatetwo key risks. The first is the persistence of material stocks of NPEs with high vintages (also referredto as legacy NPEs) and limited provision coverage, which constitute lasting sources of potentialfurther losses and restrict banks’ capacity for newlending. The second is the possibility ofinconsistencies in the prudential treatment of those NPEs which are subject to the deductionrequirementunder Regulation(EU)No 575/2013 and those which are not,where thoseinconsistencies are not justified by specific circumstances. (8)Those two key risks are material. The aggregated ratios of NPEs both for significant and for lesssignificant supervised entities have in general exhibit