美国_经济_思想_财富_财富

Mind thetariffgap Theeffectivetariffrate increase has been limited despitehigh-profile announcements, helping to explain the benigneffectson activity and inflation. However, delayedeffectsandnewtariffscould create an additional 1% drag on GDP. Atleast three-quarters of the priceeffectis yet to come. Mark Cus Babic+1 212 526 1870mark.cusbabic@barclays.comBCI, US Marc Giannoni+1 212 526 9373marc.giannoni@barclays.comBCI, US •As of June, over half of imports continued to enter the US duty-free and theeffectivetariffrate was "just" 10%. Jonathan Millar+1 212 526 4876jonathan.millar@barclays.comBCI, US •The real surprise in the US economy’s resilience lies not in its reaction totariffsbut that therise in theeffectivetariffrate has been more modest than commonly thought. •Our models suggesttariffshave exerted a drag of 0.4% on GDP thus far and point toan additional hit of c.1% due to further increases intariffsand the delayedeffectsof pastones. We expecttariffsto raise the headline price level by 0.8% in total, with at least three-quarters of theeffectyet to come. Pooja Sriram+1 212 526 0713pooja.sriram@barclays.comBCI, US •Theeffectivetariffincrease up to June is likely only about half of the eventual total hike:higher reciprocaltariffshave already been announced, new sectoraltariffsare in the pipeline,some carve-outs may be removed, and the current extent of trade diversion may proveunsustainable. Whether the electronics exemption remains in place will be key to watch. Colin Johanson+1 212 526 8536colin.johanson@barclays.comBCI, US •Using an extremely granular dataset, we demonstrate that the limited increase ineffectivetariffsso far is largely due to trade diversion away from China and many exemptions,including USMCA and a long list of goods entering duty-free without trade programs. •By replicating two regional Fed papers, we benchmark actual economic outcomes so far –such as drag on GDP and the boost to prices – and show they are broadly in line with modelpredictions given the implementedtariffs.Price pass-through until June was slightly moremuted than implied by models, but the estimates suggest it will continue. Source: US Treasury, Haver Analytics, Barclays Research UStariffrevenues have increased markedly in FY25. As of June, year-to-date customs receiptstotaled $108bn—nearly double the $55.6bn collected by the same point in FY24. While slightlyhigher import volumes this year ($2.6 trillion vs. $2.3 trillion) contributed to the rise, the primarydriver has been the Trump administration's substantialtariffhikes, which have elevated rateson many products to levels not seen in decades. However, from another perspective,tariffrevenues have underperformed relative toexpectations. In May, the US economy faced a 10% universaltariff,sector-specific rates of 25%on steel, aluminum, and autos, and elevatedtariffson Chinese imports. Based on theseannouncements, we estimated a weighted averagetariffrate of approximately 12% at the endof May1and likely higher for the full month. In contrast,tariffrevenues imply the actualeffectivetariffrate was just 9.4% in May, rising only marginally to 10.0% in June. This gap is both economically and fiscally meaningful. Assuming stable monthly imports of$300bn, a 2pp gap in thetariffrate implies a $720bn shortfall intariffrevenue over a 10-yearhorizon—equivalent to roughlyone-fifthof the primary deficit expansion attributable to theOBBBA. Moreover, the gap corresponds to a 0.1–0.2ppdifferencein inflationary impact2,suggesting a more mutedeffecton growth as well. This may help explain why the observedeconomiceffecthas been relatively benign thus far. In this report, we investigate the sources of the gap between announced andeffectivetariffrates, assess whether economic outcomes align with those predicted by models under actualtariffpolicy, and discuss the likely trajectory oftariffs.We find that the relatively muted increasein theeffectivetariffrate through June explains the relatively benign economiceffectobservedthus far. However, given the delayedeffectsoftariffincreases and newtariffsput in place, weexpect theeffectsto intensify in coming quarters. Unpacking the lowtariffrate Trade diversion Using very granular import data from the Census Bureau (see Data appendix for a description ofour data), we identify two primary drivers behind the relatively loweffectivetariffrate: tradediversion and the limited share of imports actually subject to duties. Both factors help reconcilethe gap betweeneffectiveand announcedtariffrates. Looking first at trade diversion, Figure 3 plots the change in countries' shares of US importsbetween 2024 and June 2025 against theireffectivetariffdifferentialfrom the overalleffectivetariff. Countries in the bottom-right quadrant—those with increasing import shares and below-averagetariffrates—are exerting downward pressure on the weighted averagetariff.Conversely,countries in thetop-leftquadrant—those with declining import shares and abo