FX_洞察力_去通胀_对冲_财富_衰退

Disinflation spillovers from thedollar's decline As the Fed faces inflationary pressures, disinflation isbecoming a solid baseline for the rest of the world. Thisimplies central bank divergence that should weigh onexpensive currencies like the euro and boost front-end ratesin Asia. Skylar Montgomery Koning +1 212 526 8034skylar.montgomerykoning@barclays.comBCI, US LefterisFarmakis+44 (0) 20 3555 6549lefteris.farmakis@barclays.comBarclays, UK Themistoklis Fiotakis+44 (0) 20 7773 2002themos.fiotakis@barclays.comBarclays, UK Inflation divergence and its repercussions •A combination oftariffs,resilient hard data, declining immigration and a weaker dollar feedsinto our expectation that US inflation will rise. In contrast, the RoW has not imposedretaliatorytariffsand is faced with the disinflationaryeffectsof currency strength, weakeningglobal demand, lower oil prices and excess supply from China. •We go through each inflation driver in turn below and conclude that Europe and Asia are mostat risk of lower than expected inflation. •This implies dovish risks and favours receiving positions in rates for Asian central banks, suchas Malaysia and Korea, where inflation is already low and not much easing is priced. TheECB's stanceshiftedmore hawkish in July, but there are limits to the euro's strength in light ofthe deterioration in the region's international competitiveness. UStariffsare a disinflationary demand shock for theworld The flip side of the substantial dollar decline in H1 25 is a boost to practically all the currencieswe cover (Figure 1). These sharp currency moves add to the case that as the Fed likely facesinflationary pressures, disinflation is becoming a solid baseline for the rest of the world. Thisimplies central bank divergence that should weigh on expensive currencies like the euro andargues for receiving rates in Asian economies that were already struggling with low inflation. FIGURE 1. The dollar declined broadly in the first half of 2025 Note: Crosses are XXXUSD and the dollar is DXY.Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Research The UStariffsare a price level shock that may or may not generate second roundeffects,depending on demand conditions and firms' pricing power on the ground. With hard dataholding up, including the labour market, the US consumer appears to still have spending power.Sharply declining immigration is also constraining labour supply and could exert furtherupward pressure on wages, while a weak dollar only adds to the inflationary pressures. Our USeconomics team thus expects core CPI to end the year at 3.7% y/y. Outside the US, the outlook is verydifferent.Most economies have not imposed retaliatorytariffs(absent Canada), implying less of a price shock. The first few framework deals that wehave from the UK, Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan also suggest that trading partners areincreasingly willing to accept a fairly high minimum level oftariffsand the correspondingeconomic damage. At the same time, currency strength, weakening global demand, lower oilprices and excess supply from China all imply disinflation. We go through each driver in turnbelow and conclude that Europe and Asia are most at risk of lower than expected inflation. Drivers of disinflation Our previous work on the FX pass through to CPI for G10 economies shows that the pass-through for G4 ex-Europe is between 0.1-0.2. The large dollar depreciation we saw in H1 thusimplies a peak boost to inflation of c.1pp in the next six to nine months, should it provepermanent and not counting the directeffectfromtariffs(Figure 2). The eurozone has a nearzero measured FX pass-through, though the combination of UStariffsplus substantial EURappreciation also generate disinflationary risks. We also proxy the FX pass-through for EMs using the beta of XXXUSD to local inflation (Figure 3).Though we generally find smaller FX pass-through than typically reported in the literature, Asianeconomies should experience a stronger disinflationary impulse than, say, LatAm. Aside from the direct pass-through, currency appreciation is also likely to be a headwind forgrowth via weaker net exports. The trade dependence of European and some Asian economiesmakes them more vulnerable (Figure 4). In addition, historically high UStariffrates imply adownturn in global trade and GDP, a risk that is accentuated for those economies with heavy UStrade concentration (Figure 5). Demand weakness, in turn, adds to the downward pressure oninflation as it lessens the ability of firms to raise prices. Our third disinflationary force is oil, where the more than 15% decline we have seen in the pastyear will also feed into lower headline inflation across economies. To gauge the oil pass-through, we use a 2017 IMF paper, which notes that the share of transport in the CPI basket andenergy subsidies are the most robust factors explaining cross-country variations in theeffectsofoil price shocks. In Figure 6, we usecoefficientsfrom the aforementioned IMF paper to g