产业政策与企业绩效：一种增强的关系

* “The author(s) would like to thank” footnote, as applicable.IMF Working PaperResearchDepartmentIndustrial Policies and Firm Performance: ANuanced RelationshipPrepared byRafael Machado Parente, Sandra Baquie, Yueling Huang,Florence Jaumotte, Jaden Kim, Samuel PienknaguraAuthorized for distribution byAntonio SpilimbergoJuly2025IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by theauthor(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.ABSTRACT:Thispaper empirically studies the relationship between industrial policies (IPs) and firmperformance, showing it varies by instrument, firm and industry characteristics, value chain position, and timehorizon. Consistent with the trade literature, IPs reducing trade barriers are linked to medium termimprovements in firm performance. Subsidies discriminating against foreign interests are linked to short termimprovements in value added (VA), productivity and payroll, which fade or turn negative in the medium term.Export incentives are linked to short term declines in firm performance followed by medium term gains. Theserelationships are stronger for young and financially constrained firms compared to older and less financiallyconstrained firms. Industry distortions also matter—IPs are linked to stronger improvements in VA, capital andpayroll in the short term when distortions are high. Finally, we find cross-sectoral spillovers: protective IPstargeting upstream sectors are associated with improved outcomesin downstream firms, while those targetingdownstream sectors correlate with weaker upstream performance. Cross-sectoral spillovers from tradeliberalizing policies are consistently positive and larger in magnitude, regardless of value chain position.RECOMMENDED CITATION:Machado Parente, Rafael, Sandra Baquie, Yueling Huang, Florence Jaumotte,Jaden Kim, and Samuel Pienknagura. 2025. “Industrial Policies and Firm Performance: A NuancedRelationship”, IMF Working Paper No. 2025/143.L52, D22, O25, D57Industrial Policies; Firm Performance; Subsidies; Export Incentives;Productivityrmachadoparente@imf.org, sbaquie@imf.org, yhuang5@imf.org,fjaumotte@imf.org, jkim6@imf.org, spienknagura@imf.org JEL ClassificationNumbers:Author’s E-Mail Address: Keywords: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDIndustrial Policies and FirmPerformance: A NuancedRelationshipPrepared by Rafael Machado Parente, Sandra Baquie, Yueling Huang,Florence Jaumotte,Jaden Kim, andSamuel Pienknagura,**The authors would like to thank Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and AntonioSpilimbergo for valuable feedback at different stages of thisproject, and Reka Juhasz and Nathan Lane for kindly sharing the data in Juhasz et al. (2023). The authors also thankGhislainAfavi,Mathew Day,Bertrand Gruss,Adam Jacubik,PetyaKoeva-Brooks, Nan Li, Jean-Marc Natal, Manasa Patnam. LorenzoRotunno,IppeiShibata,Alexandre Solacci, Monika Sztajerowska,Petia Topalova¸andMaryam Vazirifor valuable comments.The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or itsmanagement. All errors are our own. Contents1Introduction2Data and Summary Statistics2.1Industrial policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102.2Firm-level data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112.3Other data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122.4Final sample and summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123Empirical Specifications3.1Baseline local projections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143.2Firm-level heterogeneity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163.3Industry-level heterogeneity: The role of distortions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163.4Tit-for-tat industrial policies and firm performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173.5Caveats to baseline specifications and alternative methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . .184Results4.1Baseline results by instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .204.2Results by firm characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224.3The relevance of industry-level distortions and position in the supply chain. . . . .244.4IPs and tit-for-tat dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .254.5Robustness checks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265ConclusionAppendicesAAdditional figures and tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40List of Figures1Protectionist IPs implemented across instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142Protectionist domestic subsidies and firm performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203Protectionist export