美国移民：两股强劲逆风

Restricted - External EconomicsMarc Giannoni+1 212 526 9373marc.giannoni@barclays.comBCI, USJonathan Millar+1 212 526 4876jonathan.millar@barclays.comBCI, USPooja Sriram+1 212 526 0713pooja.sriram@barclays.comBCI, USColin Johanson+1 212 526 8536colin.johanson@barclays.comBCI, USThematic FICC ResearchZornitsa Todorova+44 (0) 20 3134 4561zornitsa.todorova@barclays.comBarclays, UKCarlos Eduardo Garcia Martinez+1 212 523 7426carlosed.garciamartinez@barclays.comBCI, US 1These programs include the CBP One App and the Parole for Cubans Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (CHNV),among others.our view, theseshiftsare about to create significant and persistent headwinds to potentialgrowth in the labor force and economic activity. While population aging is certainly not new(see, eg, Daunting demographics), we expect itseffectson labor supply to intensify very soon.This would stand in sharp contrast to the pre-pandemic years, when the non-immigrant laborforce was trending up, contributing to overall labor force growth even when immigration waslimited.In this report, we attempt to quantify theeffectsof immigration and population aging on the USpotentiallabor force and economic activity. While the surge of immigration flows over the pastfew years has sparked political debate and challenged local resources in certain areas of thecountry, we focus solely on the labor supplyeffectsof immigration, setting aside discussionabout trade, fiscal policy, and other aggregate demand fluctuations.We conclude that headwinds from these two influences will likely result in a significant andsustained slowing of payroll employment. This will weigh on potential output, absent policychanges. Our simulations showpotentialprivate nonfarm payroll employment gainsdecelerating to an average of about 60k/m in 2025 and to less than 10k/m in 2026 and 2027,reflecting slowdowns in both potential private nonfarm payroll employment among immigrantsand declines in the US non-immigrant labor force. This would causepotentialreal GDP growthto slow as contributions from aggregate hours worked gradually vanish in 2026 and beyond. Atthat point, activity growth is projected to be driven almost entirely by productivity gains. Itremains to be seen if productivity-enhancing technological improvements, such as theadoption of AI, or future adjustments to immigration policy canoffsetthe drag.Immigration provided a mighty tailwindThe Barclays Immigration Tracker – a monthly dataset of net immigration flows, carefullyconstructed using 14differentgovernment sources – shows that immigration added on netaround 3-4mn to the US population annually over the past three years. This is more than triplethe pace in the years preceding the pandemic (Figure 1). While visa holders and unlawful entriescontributed to the overall increase, the bulk of the surge from 2022 to 2024 stemmed from asharp rise in what we term humanitarian immigrants – individuals granted temporaryauthorization to live and work in the US under asylum claims or various humanitarian paroleprograms, represented by the light blue bars in Figure 1.1 2 2As discussed in A mighty tailwind, we do not rely on the Current Population Survey (CPS) published by the BLS to get anestimate of foreign-born employment, as the survey is based on a small sample andsuffersfrom increasingly stalepopulation weights over the course of a given calendar year, as well as large discrete realignments and compositionalchanges from sampling variation. We don't use data on work permits either as these are subject to double countingissues related to immigrants switching humanitarian status, as discussed in The work permits puzzle. We find it morereliable to assess the foreign-born employment based on the Barclays Immigration Tracker. In addition, informationabout the type of immigrants helps us assess the contribution to payroll employment.3Possible exceptions include unauthorized immigrants who obtain Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITIN),instead of social security numbers, and workers who successfully claim legal employment status via unconventionalchannels, such as using another person's social security number.Note: Number labels show total net flows. Data through March 2025.Source: US Department of Homeland Security, US Department of State, US Customs and Border Protection, US SocialSecurity Administration, Congressional BudgetOffice,TRAC Immigration, Barclays ResearchThe surge in immigration boosted the US labor force in 2022-24Taking into account various characteristics - such as type of immigrant, age, family status, andvisa category - we estimate the number of immigrants likely to participate to the US labormarket (see Appendix of A mighty tailwind for details).2We estimate that the immigration surgehas added more than 2mn people annually to the labor force, on average, from 2022 to 2024.This is more than four times the average observed in the pre-pandemic years (Figure 2).Importantly, most of these immigrants are e