U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EASTA Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats ProjectAuthorsSeth G. Jones | Seamus P. DanielsMAY 2022 MAY 2022U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EASTA Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats ProjectAUTHORSSeth G. JonesSeamus P. DanielsLanham • Boulder • New York • London IIABOUT CSISThe Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit pol-icy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges.Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, suc-ceeding former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000.CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-dis-ciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact.CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their re-search, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public.CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key poli-cymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).© 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.ISBN: 978-1-5381-7049-6 (pb); 978-1-5381-7050-2 (eBook) Center for Strategic and International Studies1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20036202-887-0200 | www.csis.orgRowman & Littlefield4501 Forbes BoulevardLanham, MD 20706301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com IIIIIIACKNOWLEDGMENTSWe would like to thank numerous individuals for their assistance during the research, writing, revision, and publication phases of this report. We interviewed and discussed our preliminary findings with individuals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. intelligence community, and allied and partner governments in the Middle East and Europe. While most of these individuals did not want to be named, we thank them nonetheless for their time and insights.Thanks to Michael McNerney and Mark Cancian for their outstanding reviews of an early draft. We asked them to be critical and blunt in pointing out errors in the logic of the argument and evidence—and they delivered. Their comments were extraordi-narily helpful. Several others provided valuable comments and critiques along the way, including Jon Alterman, Chris Bernotavicius, John Hamre, Todd Harrison, Benjamin Jensen, Tom Karako, Michelle Macander, Brian McSorley, Danielle Ngo, Christopher Reid, Normal Roule, and Matt Strohmeyer.Thanks also to Nicholas Harrington, Catrina Doxsee, Jared Thompson, Grace Hwang, James Suber, and Kateryna Halstead for their valuable research assistance. Joseph Bermudez and Jennifer Jun helped identify and analyze satellite imagery of Russian and Chinese activity in the Middle East. Finally, we would like to thank CSIS’s iLab team for their outstanding job in editing, formatting, and publishing the document.This report is made possible by generous support from the Smith Richardson Foundation. IVIVCONTENTSExecutive Summary ........................................................................................................................... VI01 | Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 102 | Historical Trends ...................................................................................................................... 603 | Alternative U.S. Force Postures .................................................................................... 1904 | Scenarios .................................................................................................................................. 3805 | Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 51Appendix: Middle East Scenarios ............................................................................................ 62About the Authors ............................................................................................................................ 68Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................ 69 VEXECUTIVE SUMM