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清算人和债权人的欢迎消息

2026-07-01 翰宇国际律师事务所 Hallam贾文强
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Australia – July 2026 Mr. and Mrs. Fillipini and the corporate trustee entity (theFillipini Parties) appealed the freezing orders over theMelbourne properties and the cars on the basis that, underorthodox trust law, a beneficiary of a discretionary trust doesnot have a proprietary interest in any particular asset of thetrust fund. On that basis, it was argued, insofar as the Federal Background Prior to entering liquidation, Keystone Asset Management(Keystone)was the responsible entity of a registeredmanaged investment scheme, the Shield Master Fund (SMG), Between 2022 and 2024, Keystone, as trustee of theADPF, made payments totalling AU$305 million to ChiodoCorporation, of which Paul Chiodo was a director, for It is alleged that Chiodo Corporation subsequently madepayments totalling at least AU$158 million to a Mr. Fillipiniand his company, City Built, for purported construction anddevelopment works that it is now alleged never occurred. The Full Federal Court decision First, the Full Federal Court (Beach, Button and Younan JJ)noted High Court authority to the effect that the power tomake freezing orders must be exercised according to theexigencies of the case and that “the schemes which a debtor Keystone’s liquidators sought and obtained freezing ordersover a wide range of assets of Mr. Fillipini to prevent thedissipation or disposal of those assets pending a judgment.The appeal to the Full Federal Court inFillipini v KeystoneAsset Management (in liquidation)[2026] FCAFC 71 relatedto freezing orders made in respect of specific assets that The Full Court then noted that the language of the relevantprovision, which includes “assets (including claims andexpectancies)”, is inconsistent with the proposition that a In this respect, just because Mr. Fillipini’s rights as abeneficiary under a discretionary trust were no more thanan “expectancy”, this did not preclude the power to makefreezing orders over the trust assets, particularly where thethird party may be amenable to some compulsive processrequiring it to disgorge the assets to satisfy a judgment debt. The Trusts Both properties are held by discretionary trusts with Mr.Fillipini as the appointer, and his wife, Mrs Fillipini, as thetrustee. The cars are held by a separate discretionary trust,the trustee of which is corporate entity for which Mr. Fillipini isthe sole shareholder. The only director is an accountant whom For each of the discretionary trusts, Mr. Fillipini is a beneficiaryand, as appointer, has power to remove and appoint thetrustee. It was also common ground between the parties thatMr. Fillipini can otherwise appoint himself trustee, distribute all The Full Court noted that, in the case of a discretionary trust inrespect of which a prospective judgment debtor was merelya beneficiary, it is doubtful that the circumstances could everwarrant a freezing order being made. However, it is different While Mr. Fillipini was a beneficiary of the three trusts, hisexpectancy is not of the same character as other merebeneficiaries, because he held extensive powers underthe trust deeds to control each trust, appoint himself astrustee, and direct the distribution of the income and assets.According to the Full Court, this put him in a very different Key Takeaways The decision provides significant clarity in respect ofthe ambit of the court’s power to make freezing ordersagainst the assets of discretionary trusts and has real •A prospective judgement debtor does not needto have a proprietary or beneficial interest in trust The Fillipini Parties raised an argument that the freezingorders should only be granted where it could bedemonstrated that there was a clear “enforcement pathway”by which the trust assets could ultimately be accessed in •The touchstone is control. In circumstances inwhich a prospective judgment debtor can exercise This argument was rejected by the Full Court. It wasinconsistent with the text of the relevant provision that theidentification and enforcement pathway was a preconditionto enlivening the power to make freezing orders. All that isrequired is a “reasonably arguable” case for an enforcementpathway, noting that a case with a potential avenue to •It is not a precondition to the freezing orders thatthe party seeking the order must identify a clear“enforcement pathway” by which the trust assets •All that is required is a “reasonably arguable” casefor an enforcement pathway. •The uncertainty in relation to the ambit of freezingorders to third-party trustees that was created by Referring to the relief granted in another case, Mr. Fillipini alsooffered to be restrained from exercising his powers under thetrust deeds as a possible solution to avoid the freezing orders.The Full Court rejected that solution on the basis that, unlike thecircumstances in the example relied upon, a restraint against Contacts Graeme SlatteryPartner, SydneyT +61 2 8248 7876 Tom HaysteadSpecial Counsel, SydneyT +61 2 8248 7807tom.haystead@