Takeawaysfrom Xi-Trumpsummit Frank Liu(852) 3761 8957frankliu@cmbi.com.hk The Beijing summit marks the start of a stabilization window inChina-USrelations, with deliverables broadly in line with market expectations. Bothleaders found more common ground on geopolitical issues in Iran and Taiwan,though the H200 relaxation from Washington was rejected by Beijing. Whiletariff relief was limited, the more valuable outcome isthatthe series ofXi-Trumpmeetings through year-end lowers near-term escalation risk and anchorsmarket expectations. However,we believethe truce israthertacticalas near-term constraints are driving both sides toward stabilization.Washington needsstabilization andcooperationahead of the midterms and amid Middle Eastconflicts, while Beijing values a calmer external backdrop to support growth, Summitdeliverables landed within consensus.The centerpiececommercial agreement is a Boeing framework of approximately 200 firmaircraft with a conditional upside of up to 750 planes, plus 400–450 GEAerospace engines, valued atUS$17–25bn for the initial tranche. Onagriculture,USTrade RepresentativeGreer flagged a "double-digit billion"annual purchase commitment of American farm goods over three years ontop of the October 202525mnmetrictonnessoybean deal, while Chinarenewed export licenses for 425 US beef plants alongside reciprocal non-tariff carve-outs fromtheUS on dairy, aquatics, bonsai, and the recognitionof Shandong avian-influenza-free zones. On tariff, there was no majorchange, as the effective rate has already dropped materially following thestrikingdown of the IEEPA-based tariffs: the effective US rate on Chinesegoods has fallen from roughly 33% pre-ruling (11% Section 301+10% On geopolitics, both leaders found more common ground.On Iran andthe Strait of Hormuz, the two sides established a shared baseline as bothleaders agreedthatthe Strait "must remain open to support the free flow ofenergy". But the readouts diverge meaningfully on framing. The WhiteHouse foregrounded opposition to militarization and tolls and publicized Xi's ceasefire" through negotiation as the fundamental solution. We read theasymmetry as Beijing preserving its Tehran-relationship optionality as Iranremains a load-bearing pillar of China's Middle East energy security, RMB-settlement architecture, and Belt-and-Road footprint. China may continueto provide discreet back-channel mediation, in line with its April role behindtheshortPakistan-brokered ceasefire. Taiwan, by contrast, remains thestructural redline of theChina-USrelationship and the single issue mostcapable of derailing the stabilization framework. Critically, we see Trumpas the first US president openly willing to treat Taiwan arms sales as anegotiation lever rather than a fixed strategic commitment, which creates apreviously unavailable bargaining surface for Beijing. We therefore see acredible opportunity for a transactional exchange over the coming quarters,as China extendsincremental commitmentstoUS purchases and trade Technology export controls saw no structural relaxation.The USagreed to license up to 75,000 NVIDIA H200 chips toroughly ten majorChinese tech firmseachunder a 25% tariff/fee, yet Trump confirmed on AirForceOne returning home that Beijing has refused to approve thepurchase. We thought this deliberate "buyers' strike" was motivated bythree considerations: avoiding the enrichment of the US Treasury viathe25% surcharge, protecting domestic semiconductor industrial policy, andpreservingleverage in reserve for higher-value concessions on the The relationship enters a fragile stabilization window.Both sides havepowerful near-term incentives for de-escalation. For the US, decliningdomestic approval, a compressed runway into the November midterms,and unresolved Middle East pressure require stabilization with China andits cooperation; for China, the subdued domestic demand raises the valueof a calmer external environment,andunderscores the needtopreserveleverageon Taiwan and secure incremental space for tech and AIadvancement through equipment access. However, the paths may divergeafter the mid-term election, as the natural bipartisancommon groundisprecisely a tougher posture on China, and the truce architecture becomesstructurally exposed. Looking forward,wedo not expect full decoupling, asthe asymmetric dependencies are too embedded, but rather an evolutiontoward strategic-sector decoupling layered with partial re-coupling in low- Disclosures& Disclaimers Analyst Certification The research analyst who is primary responsible for the content ofthis research report, in whole or in part, certifies that with respect to the securities or issuerthat the analyst covered in this report: (1) all of the views expressed accurately reflect his or her personal views about the subject securities or issuer;and (2)no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific views expressed by that analyst in this report