中央交易对手的公开定量披露标准

Board of the InternationalOrganization of SecuritiesCommissions Public quantitativedisclosure standards forcentral counterparties February 2015Revised May 2026 (update for consultation) This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org) and the IOSCO website (www.iosco.org). ©Bank for International Settlements and International Organization of Securities Commissions 2026. Allrights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. Statement by IOSCO: Certain IOSCO authorities may consider rule proposals or standards that relate to thesubstance of this report. These authorities provided information to IOSCO or otherwise participated in thepreparation of this report, but their participation should not be viewed as an expression of a judgment bythese authorities regarding their current or future regulatory proposals or of their rulemaking or standardsimplementation work. This report thus does not reflect a judgment by, or limit the choices of, these authoritieswith regard to their proposed or final versions of their rules or standards. ISBN 978-92-9197-048-3 (online) Introduction The CPSS-IOSCOPrinciples for financial market infrastructures(PFMI)1 states that financial marketinfrastructures (FMIs) should provide relevant information to participants, relevant authorities and thebroader public. Quantitative data are important components of the set of public disclosures that isexpected of FMIs as part of satisfying the PFMI. This document sets out the public quantitative disclosurestandards that central counterparties (CCPs) are expected to meet. These standards complement theDisclosure frameworkpublished by CPSS and IOSCO in December 2012. These quantitative disclosures, together with theDisclosure framework, form the minimum disclosuresexpected of CCPs under Principle 23, Key Consideration 5, of the PFMI. CCPs are encouraged to completethis minimum set of disclosures as soon as practicable, and by 1 January 2016 at the latest, and to updatein accordance with the frequencies set out in the matrix below. CCPs should work with the relevant authorities on the preparation of the disclosures. CPMI2and IOSCOwill review the consistency of the disclosures as part of their wider work on monitoring implementation ofthe PFMI. Purpose of the disclosures The disclosures are intended to support the objectives of enabling stakeholders, including authorities,participants (direct, indirect and prospective) and the public, to: •compareCCP risk controls,including their financial condition and financial resources towithstand potential losses;•have a clear, accurate and full understanding of the risks associated with a CCP (in accordancewith Principle 23, Key Consideration 5);•understand and assess a CCP’s systemic importance and its impact on systemic risk in alljurisdictions and currency areas for which it provides services, from which it has materialmembership or in which there are linked infrastructures; and•understand and assess the risks of participating in CCPs (directly, and, to the extent relevant,indirectly). Principle 23 states that FMIs should, at a minimum, disclose “basic data” on transaction volumes andvalues. Principle 23 also states that FMIs should disclose data on their financial condition, their financialresources to withstand potential losses, the timeliness of settlements, and other performance statistics.They should disclose sufficient information for participants and prospective participants to understandfully the risks of participating in the system. This disclosure is expected to be to the public rather thanrestricted to participants or members. ThePublic quantitative disclosure standards for central counterpartiesestablish a common set of such “basic data” on transaction volumes and values, and a common minimumset of quantitative information on the financial condition, financial resources and performance of a CCP. The quantitative disclosures should be seen and interpreted as a part of the overall disclosures made byCCPs to satisfy Principle 23 and theDisclosure framework. Given the differences between the markets andproducts cleared by CCPs, and differences in CCP structure, it is likely to be important for CCPs tocomplement the minimum quantitative disclosures with appropriate explanatory notes, and links to otherqualitative disclosures, so that recipients can understand the data correctly. In the context of understanding and assessing the risks of participating in CCPs, the objective of CPMI andIOSCO is not to provide policy guidance on a set of information that is sufficient for counterparty duediligence reviews, notwithstanding that the proposed metrics would be supportive of such reviews. Tocomplete such due diligence reviews, CCP participants may have legitimate requirements for additionalinformation from CCPs. In preparing these quantitative disclosure standards CPMI and IOSCO have had regard to commentsprovided by CCPs and CCP part