最新电子指标对亚洲的影响

EconomicsAsia What the latestelectronics indicators mean for Asia ◆Asia’s electronics PMI rose to 54.1 last month, the highestsince July 2021;global electronics PMI also held up (at52.6) Justin FengEconomist, AsiaThe Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limitedjustin.feng@hsbc.com.hk+852 22887108 ◆Input prices are surging from AI-driven demand, higherenergyprices, and shipping disruptionsinthe Straitof Hormuz Frederic NeumannChief Asia Economist, Co-head Global Research AsiaThe Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limitedfredericneumann@hsbc.com.hk+852 2822 4556 ◆China’s indigenous chipmaking capabilities have significantlyimproved; watch for AI,anti-involution, and the Middle East Abanti BhaumikAssociateBangalore Electronics supply chain crunch Operating conditions in the global electronics sectorremainedhealthy in March, withthe PMI at52.6. Thisrepresentsa modest easing from 53.1in February but stillsignalsexpansion (any reading above 50). Asia continued to lead: the regional electronicsPMI rose from 52.9 in February to54.1last month, its strongest level since July 2021. As we flagged in last month’snote(17 March 2026),supply chain pressures arebuilding–input costs are rising quickly, supplier delivery times are lengthening, andpurchase stocks remain low. Chart 3 andChart4 suggestthatthese strainsintensified again in March.Strong AI-related demandis absorbing key components,particularly memory chips, tightening availability for other electronics end-markets. Atthe same time,prolongeddisruptions inthe Strait of Hormuzcould push upenergy costs and constrain supplies of critical inputs, such as helium and sulphur. The upside is that the AI boom–reinforced bysturdycapex intentions this year–should helpprotectproducers against elevated global volatility, as reflected inresilient global new orders (Chart 1 andChart2). Mainland Chinese chipmakers:shaking off US tech restrictions On 7 October 2022, the US imposed sweeping export controls intended to capmainland China’s advanced chipmaking at 14nm for logic, 128-layer for NAND, and18nm half-pitch for DRAM.1Despite these restrictions, leadingcompanieshave metor exceeded theselimits: SMIC can now commercially produce 7nm chips, YMTCships 270-layer NAND, and CXMT is developing DDR5 (sub-18nm-equivalentDRAM).2 As the saying goes,“necessity is often the mother of innovation.” 1“Insight into the U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls Update,”CSIS, 20 October 20232“China’s No. 2 chipmaker readies 7nm production as Beijing ramps up self-sufficiency drive,”Reuters, 16 March 2026; “China’s YMTC closes in on NAND leaders as Korea movesupmarket,”The Korea Herald, 7 April 2026; “China’s banned memory-maker CXMT unveilssurprising new chipmaking capabilities despite crushing US export restrictions,”Tom’sHardware, 26 November 2025 Issuer of report:The Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation Limited Disclosures & DisclaimerThis report must beread with the disclosures and the analyst certifications in the Disclosure appendix, and with the Disclaimer, which forms part of it. View HSBC Global Investment Research at:https://www.research.hsbc.com That said,the gap to the global frontierremains material. TSMC moved into 2nm massproduction at the end of 2025, while Samsung and SK Hynix continue to lead in high-bandwidthmemory (HBM). The more accurate takeaway is not that controls failed,but that they reshapedthe trajectory of mainland China’s chip industry: raising costs and complexity in the mediumterm, while simultaneouslyacceleratinglocalisation and strengthening incentives to builddomestic alternatives across tools, materials, and talent. Mainland China’s semiconductor industrial policy is increasingly focused on ecosystem depthrather than just end-product output. For instance, since late 2025, new or expanded fabs arebeing guided tosource at least 50% domestically made equipment.3Thismay bea near-term operational constraint for firms accustomed to imported tools, but it also creates thedemand-pulldomestic equipment makers historically lacked. Over time, tighter iteration loopsbetween foundries and local suppliers can improve tool performance, broaden the qualifiedvendor base, and reduce exposure to geopolitical and logistics shocks. AI is an additional tailwind, even if mainland China’s champions are less directly plugged intothe UShyperscalercapex cycle than Taiwan and Korea. Domestic AI demand is rising quickly,and there issignificantpotential in mainland China’s efficient lowercost AI models. A broaderindustry shift fromtraining(one time, compute-intensive) toinference(high-volume, lesscompute-intensive) could also be structurally supportive for mainland Chinese chipmakers (seeAsia Semiconductors: Five questions on the US-China memory chip race, 10 December 2025). A further swing factor is the government’s“anti-i”campaign, which aims to curbdestructive price competition and discourage firms from selling below cost.As Chart 14 shows,recent improvement