2020-2025年软实力趋势

Trends insoft power2020–25 March 2026 Contents ISBN: ISBN 978-1-915280-75-6DOI: https://doi.org/10.57884/FS51-KF14 Citation: MacDonald, S. and Murray, A. (2026). Trends in soft power 2020–2025.British Council. https://doi.org/10.57884/FS51-KF14 British Council – The UK’s international culture and education organisationThe British Council is the United Kingdom’s international organisation for cultural relationsand educational opportunities. © British Council 2026, licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial4.0 International Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/bync/4.0/) AcknowledgementsExecutive summary 1. Introduction91.1 The report’s aims 101.2 Analytical approach101.3 The assets-infrastructure-outcomes approach to soft power metrics11 1.4 Context 2. Soft power assets132.1 Introduction 132.2 What our research can say about assets142.3 What our research cannot yet say about assets152.4 Understanding what works in practice 3. Infrastructure173.1 Introduction 183.2 Policy frameworks and strategic coordination353.3 Resources and funding models513.4 Geography and deployment patterns653.5 Technology and digital engagement 4. Outcomes714.1 Introduction 754.2 Overall performance rankings774.3 Efficiency analysis794.4 Reputation and perception outcomes804.5 Attraction and engagement outcomes814.6 Influence and cooperation outcomes814.7 Network and relationship outcomes824.8 Recognition and legitimacy outcomes834.9 Temporal dimensions and trajectory analysis844.10 Implications for strategic planning 5. Conclusion875.1 Main findings 885.2 Implications for the United Kingdom895.3 Strategic considerations Appendices90Appendix A: Definitions – assets, infrastructures, outcomes 96Appendix B: Methodology106Appendix C: Digital maturity framework110 Appendix D: Sources Acknowledgements This report was commissioned by the British Council fromICR Research Ltd, London. The ICR Research team comprised Stuart MacDonald, FRSA, Dr AndrewMurray, Jake Van Clief (University of Edinburgh) and Evie Aspinall (BritishForeign Policy Group). The authors are very grateful to Dr Clare Llewellynand Constantine Kyritsopolous of the University of Edinburgh for academicvalidation of the methodological framework, and to the diplomatic postswho participated in the research despite challenging operational constraints. The British Council team was led by Mona Lotten and Alistair MacDonald.The research was carried out between June and September 2025. The interpretations offered in this report are those of the authorsand do not necessarily represent the views of the British Councilor its officers. Similarly, the authors take full responsibility for any errors. Lead authors:Stuart MacDonald, FRSA, and Dr Andrew MurrayICR Research Limited Executive summary This systematic comparative analysis of soft power across 25 jurisdictionscovering the period 2020–2025 (see Table 1) and drawing on availablequantitative and qualitative evidence identifies marked shifts in how nationsdeploy cultural, educational and diplomatic resources to achieve internationalinfluence. The global soft power landscape increasingly rewards strategiccoherence over resource scale, with evidence suggesting that countriesachieving closer alignment between policy objectives, institutional mandatesand programme delivery secure superior returns on investment. Germany emerges from this study as the most effective soft powerperformer due to its well-established, integrated institutional approach.This reflects the benefits of the tripartite structure linking the Goethe-Institut,the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD – Deutscher AkademischerAustauschdienst) and German International Cooperation (GIZ – DeutscheGesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), which has operatedsuccessfully for over a decade. The findings suggest that sustainedinstitutional specialisation can maximise impact while maintainingstrategic coherence. Traditional soft power leaders are facing mounting challenges as theinternational environment becomes more competitive. The United Statesis undergoing retrenchment of public diplomacy infrastructure under thesecond Trump presidency, driven by ideological shifts in foreign policypriorities and a reorientation towards hard power investments rather thanefficiency concerns. This retrenchment, including significant reductionsin U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes andconstraints on Voice of America, creates strategic opportunities forcompetitors. Whilst China has contracted its Confucius Institute networkby approximately 54per cent (from 990 to 459 locations, as detailedin Section3.4) following international pressure and host country concernsabout academic freedom, it is simultaneously repositioning its soft powerstrategy through the Chinese International Education Foundation andmaintaining substantial investment in other mechanisms, potentiallycapitalising on aspects of the vacuum created by US