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IMF staff regularly produces papers proposing new IMF policies, exploring options forreform, or reviewing existing IMF policies and operations. The following document hasbeen released and is included in this package: •TheStaff Reportprepared by IMF staff and completed on September 12, 2025. The report prepared by IMF staff has benefited from comments and suggestions byExecutive Directors following the informal session on September 26, 2025. Suchinformal sessions are used to brief Executive Directors on policy issues and to receivefeedback from them in preparation for a formal consideration at a future date. Nodecisions are taken at these informal sessions. The views expressed in this paper arethose of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF'sExecutive Board. The IMF’s transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive informationand premature disclosure of the authorities’ policy intentions in published staff reportsand other documents. Electronic copies of IMF Policy Papersare available to the public fromhttp://www.imf.org/external/pp/ppindex.aspx International Monetary FundWashington, D.C. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NET—A STOCKTAKING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A stocktaking in a changing global context •The Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) is a set of institutions and mechanisms thatprovide countries with insurance against shocks and crises. It offers financing whencrises occur and complements countries’ policy responses in cushioning the impactof shocks. The GFSN comprises four layers: (i) international reserves, (ii) bilateralswap arrangements (BSAs), (iii) Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs), and (iv) theInternational Monetary Fund. •The context for this stocktaking is a global environment characterized by: morefrequent shocks; an economic outlook marked by low growth, high debt, and tradetensions; transformative forces—digitalization, geoeconomic fragmentation, andclimate transition—reshaping the global landscape; and eroded policy space,including in major economies, which could constrain policy responses to futurecrises. •This global context could put the GFSN under strain. Although the GFSN is sizeablein aggregate, access is not evenly distributed, and its layers are not substitutableacross countries. Taking stock of the GFSN’s effectiveness and identifying areas forimprovement requires deeper analysis, which is the purpose of this paper. GFSN performance in recent years •The GFSN performed reasonably well during systemic crises, notably the GlobalFinancial Crisis (GFC) and the Covid-19 pandemic, helping to cushion their impactand preventing broader economic disruptions. Different GFSN layers have alsohelped countries and regions respond to numerous other shocks over the past twodecades. •However, the GFSN did not need to bear the full brunt of the GFC and Covid-19pandemic, as unprecedented policy responses by major economies, including large-scale fiscal stimulus and extraordinary monetary easing, created significant positivespillovers that counteracted strains in the international financial system and softenedthe demand for the GFSN.•Experience with the GFSN layers has been mixed: oInternational reserves remain a first line of defense and the largest global shockabsorber. However, reserve adequacy is highly uneven. Some countries, especially anumber of large emerging markets (EMs), have accumulated excess reserves, which iscostly domestically and globally, as it contributes to global imbalances. At the sametime, many other countries lack adequate reserves to manage shocks. oBilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) have alleviated stress in global markets duringsystemic crises. Notably, the unlimited swap lines between the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed)and five major central banks played a critical role during the GFC and the Covid-19pandemic in preventing the disruption of market funding in key currencies, therebycontaining contagion. BSAs have been less proven as a tool for providing balance ofpayments (BoP) support, and many lack transparency. oRegional Financing Arrangements (RFAs), which pool member resources, offer anadditional layer of liquidity support. Yet, they remain rarely used (except during theeuro-area crisis), are unevenly distributed across regions and countries, have limitedpolicy content, and leave gaps in providing timely assistance. oThe IMF has continued to play a central role in the GFSN, given its global mandate tosafeguard the stability of the International Monetary System (IMS). The Fund offers thewidest form of international risk sharing thanks to its near-universal membership andhas provided countries with policy advice, capacity development, and financing whenneeded. For many countries, the IMF remains the lender of last resort, although concernsabout stigma and policy conditionality may have discouraged demand for its lending insome instances. •Overall, the GFSN has remained heavily reliant on non-pooled resources, with un