发展中国家主权国内债务重组

Restructuring SovereignDomestic Debt inDeveloping Countries:New Cases and Lessons Eriko Togo, Hui Miao, Myrvin Anthony, Marie Kim, Joe Kogan, and KiaLuo WP/25/202 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2025OCT IMF Working Paper Monetary and Capital Markets Department RestructuringSovereignDomesticDebtin Developing Countries: New Cases and LessonsPrepared byEriko Togo, Hui Miao, Myrvin Anthony, Marie Kim, Joe Kogan, and Kia Luo* Authorized for distribution by Thordur JonassonOctober2025 IMF Working Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:Amid rising domestic sovereign debt overhang in some emerging and developing economies(EMDEs), this paper underscores the importance of effective domestic sovereign debt restructuring (DDR)strategies where a DDR is deemed necessary. The paper suggests that delayed responses to, or inaction on,rising domestic debt vulnerabilities can be costly, highlighting the importance of assessing the intertemporaltradeoff between short-term costs from a DDR and achieving long-term economic resilience. Drawing on casestudies, practical guidance is provided for designing and executing a DDR, tailored to country-specificcircumstances and constraints, to minimize risks to financial stability and domestic debt market dysfunction.Restructuring alone does not ensure success. A comprehensive macroeconomic adjustment programaddressing the root cause of debt accumulation—while distributing the burden among creditors, implementingfiscal adjustment, and securing support from the international financial community anchored by an IMFarrangement—will enhance the chance of a successful DDR outcome. RestructuringSovereignDomesticDebtin Developing Countries: NewCases and Lessons Prepared byEriko Togo, Hui Miao, Myrvin Anthony,Marie Kim, Joe Kogan,andKia Luo1 Contents Glossary...............................................................................................................................................................4I.Introduction..................................................................................................................................................5A.Background.........................................................................................................................................5B.Literature Review and Contributions...................................................................................................7II.Pre-DDR: Early Signs and Risks..........................................................................................................9A.Deteriorating Macroeconomic Conditions and Outlook.......................................................................9B.RisingDomestic Debt Vulnerabilities................................................................................................12C.Main Risk Considerationsfor Deciding on a DDR............................................................................16III.Objectives, Key Steps, and Design....................................................................................................18A.Objectives of a DDR.........................................................................................................................18B.Key Steps..........................................................................................................................................19C.Designing a DDR: Perimeter, Loss Allocation, and Risk Mitigation Measures.................................21IV.ExecutionandComplementaryPolicies...........................................................................................28A.Execution..........................................................................................................................................28B.ComplementaryPolicyMeasures During the DDR Transition Period...............................................31V.Assessment.........................................................................................................................................33A.Macroeconomic Outturns..................................................................................................................33B.Debt and GFN: Ex-Ante (Program)TargetsandOutturns................................................................36C.Burden Sharing and Comparability of Treatment..............................................................................38D.Impact onthe Financial Sector.......................................................