cbdc和银行：快速和缓慢的去中介化

CBDCand banks:disintermediating fast andslow by Rhys Bidder, Timothy Jackson and Matthias Rottner Monetary and Economic Department July 2025 JEL classification: E42, E44, E51, E52, G21 Keywords: central bank digital currencies, financial crises,disintermediation, bank runs, banking system, money BISWorking Papers are written by members of the Monetary and EconomicDepartment of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by othereconomists, and are published by the Bank. The papers are on subjects of topicalinterest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are those of theirauthors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). ©Bank for International Settlements 2025. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may bereproduced or translated provided the source is stated. CBDC and banks: Disintermediating fast and slow⋆ Rhys Biddera, Timothy Jacksonb, Matthias Rottnerc aKBS,bUniversity of Liverpool,cBank for International Settlements, Deutsche Bundesbank, Abstract We examine the impact of a retail central bank digital currency, combining survey evi-dence from German households with a macroeconomic model featuring endogenous sys-temic bank runs. The survey reveals non-trivial demand for retail CBDC as a substitutefor bank deposits in normal times (“slow disintermediation”) and increased withdrawalrisks during financial distress (“fast disintermediation”).Informed by the survey, themodel indicates that introducing a retail CBDC might reduce financial stability becauseCBDC offersstorage-at-scale- making it attractive to run to. We estimate an optimalholding limit which chokes off fast disintermediation andenhancesfinancial stability byshrinking a fragile banking system. Keywords:Central Bank Digital Currencies, Financial Crises, Disintermediation, BankRuns, Banking System, Money JEL classification:E42, E44, E51, E52, G21 The novelty with CBDCs is that they would provide access to a safe asset that – unlike cash – couldpotentially be held in large volumes, in the absence of safeguards, and at no cost, accelerating ‘digitalruns’. Such runs could even be self-fulfilling. . . Fabio Panetta, 2022,IESE Business School Banking Initiative Conference on Technology and Finance A widely available CBDC would serve as a close — or, in the case of an interest-bearing CBDC, near-perfect — substitute for commercial bank money. This substitution effect could reduce the aggregateamount of deposits in the banking system, which could in turn increase bank funding expenses, andreduce credit availability or raise credit costs for households and businesses. Board of Governors, 2022,Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation 1. Introduction Advances in payment technologies have led central banks to consider issuing centralbank money in digital form to the public, commonly referred to as retail Central BankDigital Currency (CBDC).1The potential impact of CBDC on the banking system hasbeen hotly debated with two phenomena receiving particular attention:‘slow disinterme-diation’, by which CBDC competes with bank deposits in normal times, leading to moreexpensive funding and a shrinking of the sector, and‘fast disintermediation’, by whichCBDC provides an especially convenient asset to convert to and hold in times of bankingstress, enhancing the scope for bank runs. Fast and slow disintermediation may interact and, thus, should be analysed jointly.This paper provides such an analysis through two classes of contribution - empirical andtheoretical. We document novel evidence from a survey of German households regardingtheir projected use of a hypothetical digital Euro.We then build a structural macroe-conomic model featuring CBDC and endogenoussystemicbank runs and explore theimplications of CBDC for welfare, the banking sector and policy design.The model ismatched to key European aggregate moments and is also partly informed by our sur-vey data in the absence of real world information on CBDC adoption.In allowing forboth fast and slow disintermediation we show that some of the concerns mentioned inthe quotes above may be allayed. Suitably-designed CBDC - in particular, with holdinglimits - may induce a desirable welfare effect precisely because itdoesdisintermediatebanks, reducing the fragility of a system prone to runs. Clearly, in the absence of a functioning CBDC it is difficult to establish targets foreconomic modeling. As such, surveys about hypothetical usage, particularly in such aninfluential country as Germany, are especially useful.Based on the Deutsche Bundes-bank’s Survey on Consumer Expectations we observe how people might allocate fundsacross different asset classes in various contingencies, where the assets considered include cash, bank deposits, and digital Euro deposits. Specifically, we ask how they would al-locate funds in ‘normal times’, first in the absence of a CBDC, then in the