中国：高盛经济指标更新：8月

Please find an update of our proprietary economic indicators below. The data behindour proprietary economic indicators can be downloadedhere(methodology notesavailable in the appendix). Andrew Tilton+852-2978-1802|andrew.tilton@gs.comGoldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. Hui Shan+852-2978-6634|hui.shan@gs.comGoldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. Lisheng Wang+852-3966-4004|lisheng.wang@gs.comGoldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. GS Proprietary Economic Indicators Xinquan Chen+852-2978-2418|xinquan.chen@gs.comGoldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. Yuting Yang+852-2978-7283|yuting.y.yang@gs.comGoldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. Chelsea Song+852-2978-0106|chelsea.song@gs.comGoldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, NBS, CEIC Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, NBS, CEIC Source: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: Haver Analytics, CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: Haver Analytics, CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, CEIC, Bloomberg Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, CEIC, Bloomberg Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, SAFE Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Wind, Haver Analytics, CEIC Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Wind, Haver Analytics, CEIC Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, CEIC, Wind Source: Wind, CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, local governments, Sofang.com Methodology notes for GS proprietary economic indicators Exhibit 1andExhibit 2: China Current Activity Indicator (Bloomberg ticker: GSCNCAI) is the “first1.principal component” of several real activity indicators including industrial production, electricityconsumption, PMIs, etc., expressed in GDP-equivalent units. (See the latest GS CAI methodology notehereand the revamped methodology for China CAIhere.) These indicators can be recategorized tomeasure sequential momentum in different areas of the economy — manufacturing, consumption andothers (i.e., housing and the labor markets). Exhibit 3: Ourimport-implied real domestic demandinfers China’s domestic demand by assigning all2.Chinese imports by sector to an ultimate source of final demand using China’s input-output tables. (Seea brief summary of the methodologyhere.) The real domestic demand implied by national accounts isestimated from national accounts data (GDP – (Exports – Imports)), as a cross-check for the validity ofthe sectoral imports based domestic demand. Exhibit 4: Our ChinaMAP surprise indexsummarizes the importance and strength (relative to3.consensus expectations) of economic indicators for the country. Aggregating MAP over time allows usto examine whether economic data are outperforming or underperforming consensus expectations fora certain period. Exhibit 5: Our construction growth proxy is the median year-on-year growth of housing starts,4.production of steel, cement and glass. Our manufacturing growth proxy is the median year-on-yeargrowth in production of metal cutting machine, autos, power generating equipment andmicrocomputer. (See our explanationshere.) Exhibit 6andExhibit 7: Our revisedinventory trackeris based on six underlying inventory indicators,5.including commodities, PMI sub-indices, industrial enterprises finished goods inventory, and autoinventory. After data cleaning, we derive the first principal component, which explains 25% of the totalvariation of the six series, and then map it into percentage of GDP terms as our tracker for inventorychanges. Exhibit 8andExhibit 9: Ourrevised “outside-in” trade measuresestimate China’s export growth and6.import growth using “mirror” statistics reported by its major trading partners, based on thecountry-specific lead-lag relationship, as a cross-check for the validity of China Customs trade data. Exhibit 10andExhibit 11: Ourrevised China Financial Conditions (FCI) Indextracks liquidity conditions7.by 1) funding index: AA MTN yield, 3m SHIBOR, M2 and TSF flows; 2) equity market P/E ratio; 3) RMBon a trade-weighted basis. Accordingly, the sequential change in FCI can be attributed to factorsthrough four major channels, i.e., FX, equity, credit and rates. Exhibit 12: Ourestimated growth impact of FCI impulsemeasures the impact of FCI changes on GDP8.growth (see related studies on China FCI and credit impulsehere,hereandhere). Exhibit 13: Ourpreferred gauge of FX flowstracks SAFE monthly net FX sales/settlement as well as the9.net cross-border flows of RMB. Exhibit 14andExhibit 15: OurChina domestic macro policy proxysummarizes China domestic macro10.policy stance from four aspects: 1) fiscal policy; 2) monetary policy; 3) credit policy; and 4) housingpolicy. Exhibit 16: Our mea