量化宽松的宏观经济和财政后果

Macroeconomic and FiscalConsequences of QuantitativeEasing Tobias Adrian, Christopher Erceg, Marcin Kolasa, Jesper Linde,and Pawel Zabczyk WP/25/158 IMF Working Papersdescribe research inprogress by the author(s) and are published toelicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers arethose of the author(s) and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management. 2025AUG IMF Working Paper Monetary and Capital Markets Department Macroeconomic and Fiscal Consequences of Quantitative EasingTobias Adrian,Christopher Erceg,Marcin Kolasa,Jesper Linde,and Pawel Zabczyk*1 Authorized for distribution byJulie KozackAugust 2025 IMFWorking Papersdescribe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicitcomments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of theauthor(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. ABSTRACT:Quantitative easing (QE) has been criticized for helping fuel the post-COVID inflation boom andcausing large central bank losses. In this paper, we argue that QE should be evaluated mainly on its ability toachieve core macro-objectives as well for its effects on theconsolidatedfiscal position of the government andcentral bank, although central bank losses can matter to the extent that they may weaken central bank credibility.Using a DSGE model with segmented asset markets, we show how QE can provide a sizeable boost to outputand inflation in a deep liquidity trap and can reduce public debt substantially. This contrasts to the rise in publicdebt that occurs under fiscal expansion and makes QE an attractive tool in a high debt environment. There ismore reason for caution in using QE in a“shallow" liquidity trap in which the notional interest rate is only slightlynegative: QE runs more risk of causing the economy to overheat, especially if forward guidance has a strongelement of commitment, and is more likely to generate sizeable central bank losses. Some refinements instrategy, including the use of escape clauses, can help mitigate overheating risks. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Consequences ofQuantitative Easing∗ Tobias AdrianInternational Monetary Fund and CEPRChristopher ErcegInternational Monetary FundMarcin KolasaInternational Monetary FundJesper Lind´eInternational Monetary Fund and CEPRPawel ZabczykInternational Monetary Fund This Draft: August 3, 2025 Abstract Quantitative easing (QE) has been criticized for helping fuel the post-COVID inflation boomand causing large central bank losses.In this paper, we argue that QE should be evaluatedmainly on its ability to achieve core macro-objectives as well for its effects on theconsolidatedfiscal position of the government and central bank, although central bank losses can matter tothe extent that they may weaken central bank credibility. Using a DSGE model with segmentedasset markets, we show how QE can provide a sizeable boost to output and inflation in a deepliquidity trap and can reduce public debt substantially. This contrasts to the rise in public debtthat occurs under fiscal expansion and makes QE an attractive tool in a high debt environment.There is more reason for caution in using QE in a “shallow” liquidity trap in which the notionalinterest rate is only slightly negative: QE runs more risk of causing the economy to overheat,especially if forward guidance has a strong element of commitment, and is more likely to generatesizeable central bank losses. Some refinements in strategy, including the use of escape clauses,can help mitigate overheating risks. Keywords: Monetary Policy, Effective Lower Bound, Quantitative Easing, Central Bank BalanceSheet, Government Debt, New Keynesian Model. Contents 1Introduction 2Quantitative Model2.1Households. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.2Wage Setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82.3Firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82.4Fiscal Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92.5Monetary Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112.6Market Clearing Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132.7Calibration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132.8Solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 3Transmission of QE in Deep Liquidity Traps193.1A Baseline Scenario with Slow Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3.2A Scenario with Faster Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213.3A Comparison with Conventional Fiscal Stimulus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 4QE in Shallow Liquidity Traps274.1A Baseline Scenario with Slow an