来自日本的经验教训：以及这些经验教训对中国可能意味着什么

Issuer of report:The Hongkong and ShanghaiBanking Corporation LimitedView HSBC Global Research at:https://www.research.hsbc.comListen to our insightsFind out moreHSBC Global Research PodcastsFrederic NeumannChief Asia Economist, Co-head Global Research AsiaThe Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limitedfredericneumann@hsbc.com.hk+852 2822 4556Justin FengEconomist, AsiaThe Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limitedjustin.feng@hsbc.com.hk+852 22887108Abanti BhaumikAssociateBangaloreEconomicsAsia ◆◆◆◆◆◆ History seldom repeats, but often rhymesStructural imbalanceswithin the global economy lie at the heart oftoday’strade conflicts.For decades, the US absorbed the world’s surplus goods output.This trend cannot continueforever, as it would cause US overseas indebtedness to reachunsustainablelevels, but China–which accounts formostof the world’s trade surplus(see Chart 1)–consumes too little of thegoods it produces and invests too heavily in manufacturing capacityexpansion.Toalleviatethis severe imbalance,China must curb investment and raise domesticconsumption,while the US will need to lower its goods absorption and increasesavings(seeAsia Chart of theWeek: The balance thing, 11 April 2025).Abitter pill for both countries to swallow,yes,butlikelya necessaryreadjustment to put the global economy onamore even footing over the long run.Here in Asia, a similar storyhasplayedout before.Six decades ago, Japan embarked on an extraordinary period of rapid growth–termed an‘economic miracle’ by many observers at the time–throughexport-ledindustrialisationenabledbyclose collaboration between corporations and the economic bureaucracy.Despite being aUStreaty ally, Japanstarted facingsevere blowback from Washington by theearly 1980s due to many of the same imbalancesthat characterisecontemporary US-Chinaeconomic relations.As Chart 2 shows, Japan’s surplusballoonedduring the 1980s–althoughat a notablylower scale than China today–while the US persistently rantrade deficits.As a result of this trade imbalance, American workers and companies found themselves losingjobs and market share to Japanese competitors in industries ranging from automobiles andsteel to semiconductors and household electronics.In response, US policymakers launched a flurry of Section 301 investigations, imposed 100%tariffs on roughly USD300m of Japanese goods, and persuaded Japan to dramaticallyappreciate its currency under the 1985 Plaza Accord and self-impose voluntary export restraints(seeUS-China trade tensions: Six lessons from Japan’s experience, 4 February 2025).Chart 1: Mainland China dominates globaltrade surplusesChart 2: US-Japan trade imbalances usedto drive global tradeimbalancesSource: Macrobond, HSBC.Note:Chinarefers to mainland China.Source: Macrobond, HSBC.Note:Chinarefers to mainland China.1“MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975,” Chalmers Johnson,StanfordUniversity Press(1982)-1,750-1,500-1,250-1,000-750-500-25002505007501,0001,250199920042009201420192024USD bnGlobal trade balanceChinaUnited StatesJapanEuro AreaOther-400-300-200-10001002003001979USD bnJapan 1198419891994Global trade balanceUnited StatesChinaEuro Area 1999Other 2Economic imbalances inChina and the US are the rootcause of today’s tradeconflictsThis dynamic has occurredbefore (albeit on a smallerscale) between the US andJapan China today bears several keyresemblancesto Japan during the 1980s.Bothboostedpublic and private investment by encouraging higher saving rates, which entailedslower growth for household income and consumption (see Chart 3, Chart 4, and Chart 5).Meanwhile,the US stood at the opposite end of the ledger, both in the 1980s and today, withlower investment and saving rates, along with a higher share of consumption in GDP.Furthermore,Japan and Chinaboth accumulated debt (including household, government, andnon-financial corporates),while confronting unfavourable demographic trends where theproportion of elderly increased to alarming levels (see Chart 6).At the same time, there are key differences between contemporary China and historical Japan.As wearguedbefore, China’s trade conflict with the US is unlikely to follow Japan’s pathdue toits stronger position in global manufacturing supply chains, trade diversification, and strengths inemerging technologies.The odds of Chinasuccumbingto long-term stagnation akin to Japan’s‘LostDecade(s)’ also appear lower:Chinahasarguablynot experienced asevere balancesheet recession,with its privatefirms not nearly as overleveraged as bubble-era Japanesecorporateswere (though considerable debt resided in the public sector and among real estate-related firms). Meanwhile, its lower urbanisationrate leaves room forfurthergrowthandrelatively lower per capita GDP implies a greater runway for further productivity increases.Chart 5: ...while keeping consumption lowChart 6: Bothalsoface demographicchallengesSource: World Bank, HSBCSource: United Nations, HSBC. Note: CH refers to mai