Assessment of Guinea-Bissau Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Capacity

Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness,and Response CapacityPandemic Prevention, Preparedness,and Response Capacity Assessment ofGuinea-Bissau’sPandemic Prevention, Preparedness,and Response Capacity © 2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. Thefindings,interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views ofThe World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries,colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply anyjudgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or theendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Nothing herein shall constitute or be construedor considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The WorldBank, all of which are specifically reserved. Rights and Permissions This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO)http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license,you are free to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for commercial purposes,under the following conditions: Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: World Bank. 2024. “ Assessment of Guinea-Bissau’sPandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Capacity.” Washington, DC: World Bank Translations—If you create a translation of this work, please add the following disclaimeralong with the attribution:This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not beconsidered an official World Bank translation. The World Bank shall not be liable for any content orerror in this translation. Adaptations—If you create an adaptation of this work, please add the following disclaimer alongwith the attribution:This is an adaptation of an original work by The World Bank. Views and opinionsexpressed in the adaptation are the sole responsibility of the author or authors of the adaptationand are not endorsed by The World Bank. Third-party content—The World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the contentcontained within the work. The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned individual component or part contained in the work will not infringe on the rightsof those third parties. The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.If you wish to reuse a component of the work, it is your responsibility to determine whetherpermission is needed for that reuse and to obtain permission from the copyright owner. Examplesof components can include, but are not limited to, tables, figures, or images. All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The WorldBank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Executive Summary The COVID-19 pandemic was a sobering example ofhow ill-prepared many countries were to respond toa fast-spreading disease for which the world initiallyhad few tools to defend against, the results ofwhich were many lives lost, economies devastated,and social order disrupted. It highlighted theneed for countries to increase their capacity forpandemic prevention, preparedness, and response(PPR), including dedicating financial resources toadvance preparedness, ensuring robust planningat national and subnational levels, and establishingstrong coordination and collaboration mechanismsacross sectors. To improve PPR capacity is tofundamentally make health systems stronger.Stronger health systems are more resilient toshocks, better able to adapt during times of crises,and more capable at responding to and recoveringfrom health emergencies. Governance, Partnership and Coordination G u i n e a - B i s s a uw a s f o u n d t o h a v e p o o rcoordination, particularly across sectors, andhigh fragmentation within the health sector foraddressing health emergencies. The country lacksstrategic plans related to PPR and there is no OneHealth strategy in place. There is weak financingof important public health institutions, whichprevents them from being able to effectively carryout their mandates. Chronic political instability hasled to high turnover in leadership roles resultingin the loss of institutional knowledge and a lackof continuity in health programs and initiatives.Additionally, a few leaders are overburdenedwith multiple appointments in key roles whichcontribute to delays in decision-making. Laboratory Detection and SurveillanceCapabilities Guinea-Bissau is a small country in Western Africawith a history of long-standing political instability,high poverty rates and increased vulnerability toclimate cha