美国银行业共同所有制假说的评估

Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online) Assessing the Common Ownership Hypothesis in the US BankingIndustry Serafin Grundl and Jacob Gramlich 2024-022 Please cite this paper as:Grundl,Serafin,and Jacob Gramlich(2024).“Assessingthe Common OwnershipHypothesisin the US Banking Industry,”Finance and Economics Discussion Se-ries2024-022.Washington:Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.022. NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment.The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. Assessing the Common Ownership Hypothesis in theUS Banking Industry Serafin Grundl and Jacob Gramlich∗ November 17, 2023 Abstract The U.S. banking industry is well suited to assess the common ownership hypothesis(COH), because thousands of private banks without common ownership (CO) competewith hundreds of public banks with high and increasing levels of CO. This paper as-sesses the COH in the banking industry using more comprehensive ownership data thanprevious studies. In simple comparisons of raw deposit rate averages we document that(i) private banks do offer substantially more attractive deposit rates than public banks,but (ii) the deposit rates of public banks are similar in markets without CO where asingle public bank competes only with private rivals, and in markets with CO wheremultiple public banks compete with each other. Panel regressions of deposit rates on theprofit weights implied by the COH are generally consistent with the COH if only quar-ter FEs (without other controls) are included but not if bank-quarter FEs are included.Estimates with bank-quarter FEs are “precise zeros” with 95% CIs suggesting that thethreefold rise in CO among public banks between 2005 and 2022 moved their depositrates by less than a quarter of a basis point in either direction. To assess the COH alongnon-price dimensions we also estimate the effect of CO on deposit quantities, and findthat the estimates are also not consistent with the COH. 1Introduction The U.S. banking industry is well suited to assess the common ownership hypothesis (COH),because, unlike in most other industries, there are many public and private banks (over 500and 4,000, respectively) that compete with each other. This creates substantial variation incommon ownership (CO). While there is generally no CO among private banks, public bankshave experienced a large increase in CO between 2005 and 2022.The COH predicts that therise in CO among public banks changed their objective functions such that they should caremore about competitors who are held by the same shareholders. The model by O’Brien andSalop (2000) implies that the average weight public banks place in their objective functionson rival profits increased roughly threefold between 2005 and 2022.In contrast, the COHpredicts that private banks should maximize only their own profits and that their objectivefunctions have remained unchanged. Importantly, the rise in CO among public banks creates not only variation in CO betweenbanks (especially between private and public banks), but also within individual public banksacross geographic markets.For instance, in banking markets with multiple public banksCO generally increased substantially, but in banking markets where a single public bankcompetes with private banks it did not. Banking is not only a good laboratory to test the COH, but is also an industry in whichCO is of particular policy relevance. Shareholders have to notify the Federal Reserve if theirownership share in a bank exceeds 10 percent (Change in Bank Control Act (CIBCA)) andthe Federal Reserve can object to such a CIBCA notice on competitive grounds. The bankingindustry was also specifically mentioned in President Biden’s executive order on competition.1 This paper assesses the COH in banking using more comprehensive ownership data thanprevious studies.Usually studies on the COH use data from SEC filing 13-F, which mustbe filed by institutional investment managers with $100 million or more in assets undermanagement. The holdings of large institutional investment managers tend to be diversifiedwithin industries so they often own shares of competing firms, which results in high measuredCO. This paper uses not only ownership data from the 13F filings but also from other filingssuch as SEC forms 3, 4 and 5 (“insider forms”), SEC form DEF 14A (“definitive proxystatement”), and SEC forms 13D and 13G (“beneficial ownership reports”). These filings alsocapture ownership by smaller institutional shareholde