CBDC 对金融稳定的电影

Finance and Economics Discussion SeriesFederal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online)Financial Stability Implications of CBDCFrancesca Carapella, Jin-Wook Chang, Sebastian Infante, Melissa Leistra,Arazi Lubis, and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis2024-021Please cite this paper as:Carapella, Francesca, Jin-Wook Chang, Sebastian Infante, Melissa Leistra, Arazi Lubis, andAlexandros P. Vardoulakis (2024). “Financial Stability Implications of CBDC,” Financeand Economics Discussion Series 2024-021. Washington: Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.021.NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. 1 Financial Stability Implications of CBDC1 Francesca Carapella, Jin‐Wook Chang, Sebastian Infante, Melissa Leistra, Arazi Lubis, and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System April 10, 2024 Abstract A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is a form of digital money that is denominated in the national unit of account and constitutes a direct liability of the central bank. We examine the financial stability risks and benefits of issuing a CBDC under different design options. Our analysis is based on lessons derived from historical case studies as well as on an analytical framework that allows us to characterize the mechanisms through which a CBDC can affect financial stability. We further discuss various policy tools that can be employed to mitigate financial stability risks. Keywords: CBDC, financial stability, runs, stablecoins, central bank liabilities, regulation. JEL classification: E40, E50, G01, G21, G23, G28 1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Board, or anyone in the Federal Reserve System. We thank Michael Kiley, Beth Klee, Andreas Lehnert, Daniel Sanches, Chiara Scotti, Skander Van den Heuvel for useful comments and suggestions. 2 1. Introduction A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is a form of digital money that is denominated in the national unit of account, constitutes a direct liability of the central bank, and can be distinguished from other central bank liabilities.2 A CBDC could alter the financial and payments ecosystem in far-reaching ways. Whether these changes make the financial system more stable or more fragile will depend on how CBDC is designed and how the financial system adjusts to its implementation.3 This paper examines the financial stability implications of a CBDC under different design options and discusses policy tools that can be employed to mitigate financial stability risks. As discussed in more detail below, while a CBDC could in concept be held or transferred by any party, our analysis generally follows the four broad design recommendations provided by the Federal Reserve’s 2022 discussion paper: (i) privacy protected; (ii) intermediated; (iii) widely transferable; and (iv) identity verified.4 This paper does not more generally analyze tradeoffs related to CBDC policy and design choices outside of the financial stability lens. We examine three broad ways in which a CBDC may affect financial stability.5 First, a CBDC may increase the financial sector’s vulnerability to destabilizing runs. By offering a safer asset, relative to private liabilities of the financial sector, a CBDC may present an attractive option for depositors and investors to fly to during times of stress. Some nonbank institutions, such as 2 Most central banks already provide digital liabilities in the form of reserve balances, which are mainly accessible to banks. Common definitions of CBDC do not attempt to determine on which dimensions CBDC could or should vary from other digital central bank monies. There are many potential design and policy choice variations. See for example, CMPI 2018 https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf 3 The Federal Reserve has made no decisions on whether to issue a central bank digital currency and does not intend to proceed with issuance of a CBDC without clear support from the executive branch and from Congress, in the form of a specific authorizing law (Federal Reserve Board, 2022). 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2022), “Money and Payments: The US Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation,” Discussion Paper, January 2022. 5 This paper focuses on financial stability risks from a CBDC d