CBDC 对金融稳定的电影

Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.ISSN 1936-2854 (Print)ISSN 2767-3898 (Online) Financial Stability Implications of CBDC Francesca Carapella, Jin-Wook Chang, Sebastian Infante, Melissa Leistra,Arazi Lubis, and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis 2024-021 Please cite this paper as:Carapella, Francesca, Jin-Wook Chang, Sebastian Infante, Melissa Leistra, Arazi Lubis, andAlexandros P. Vardoulakis (2024).“Financial Stability Implications of CBDC,” Financeand Economics Discussion Series 2024-021. Washington: Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.021. NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminarymaterials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment.The analysis and conclusions set forthare those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or theBoard of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other thanacknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. Financial Stability Implications of CBDC1 FrancescaCarapella,Jin‐WookChang,SebastianInfante, MelissaLeistra,AraziLubis,andAlexandrosP.Vardoulakis BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem April10,2024 Abstract ACentralBankDigitalCurrency(CBDC)isaformofdigitalmoneythatisdenominatedinthenationalunitofaccountandconstitutesadirectliabilityofthecentralbank.WeexaminethefinancialstabilityrisksandbenefitsofissuingaCBDCunderdifferentdesignoptions.OuranalysisisbasedonlessonsderivedfromhistoricalcasestudiesaswellasonananalyticalframeworkthatallowsustocharacterizethemechanismsthroughwhichaCBDCcanaffectfinancialstability.Wefurtherdiscussvariouspolicytoolsthatcanbeemployedtomitigatefinancialstabilityrisks. Keywords:CBDC,financialstability,runs,stablecoins,centralbankliabilities,regulation. JELclassification:E40,E50,G01,G21,G23,G28 1.Introduction A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is a form of digital money that is denominated in thenational unit of account, constitutes a direct liability of the central bank, and can be distinguishedfrom other central bank liabilities.2A CBDC could alter the financial and payments ecosystem infar-reaching ways. Whether these changes make the financial system more stable or more fragilewill depend on how CBDC is designed and how the financial system adjusts to its implementation.3 This paper examines the financial stability implications of a CBDC under different designoptions and discusses policy tools that can be employed to mitigate financial stability risks.Asdiscussed in more detail below, while a CBDC could in concept be held or transferred by anyparty, our analysis generally follows the four broad design recommendations provided by theFederal Reserve’s 2022 discussion paper: (i) privacy protected; (ii) intermediated; (iii) widelytransferable; and (iv) identity verified.4 This paper does not more generally analyze tradeoffsrelated to CBDC policy and design choices outside of the financial stability lens. We examine three broad ways in which a CBDC may affect financial stability.5First, aCBDC may increase the financial sector’s vulnerability to destabilizing runs. By offering a saferasset, relative to private liabilities of the financial sector, a CBDC may present an attractive optionfor depositors and investors to fly to during times of stress. Some nonbank institutions, such as prime money funds, might suffer larger or more frequent runs in the presence of a CBDC. Policytools, such as CBDC remuneration and quantity limits on CBDC holdings, have the potential tomitigate such run risks, complementing traditional central bank tools for emergency liquidityassistance. Tiered remuneration—whereby remuneration decreases as CBDC holdings increaseand can be adjusted during times of stress—could be combined with a hard quantity limit onindividual holdings. The holding limit could be chosen to prevent severe and widespread runs toCBDC, while payments in CBDC continue to be possible. The calibration of holding limits is animportant but difficult task. Given the uncertainty about the demand for CBDC, setting holdinglimits may involve a process of trial and error. Second, a CBDC may weaken financial stability by reducing the ability of banks to extendcredit during times of stress. We study a stress scenario in which the presence of a CBDC causesa withdrawal of deposits from banks, forcing them to use less desirable funding sources despitenot necessarily precipitating a crisis. Using various estimates from the literature, we find thatfunding costs and, in turn, the rates charged to borrowers, may increase by 50 to 250 basis pointsin stress times. We roughly estimate that such higher borrowing rates may result in a decrease ofabout 1 to 5 percent in C&I lending. Third, to the extent a CBDC is made more broadly available than other digital central bankliabilities, it could make the financial