Biosecurity Innovation and Risk Reduction: A Global Framework for Accessible, Safe and Secure DNA Synthesis

Insight ReportBiosecurity Innovation and Risk Reduction: A Global Framework for Accessible, Safe and Secure DNA Synthesis January 2020 In collaboration with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) PrefaceForewordIntroductionExecutive summaryDeveloping a common DNA sequence screening mechanismOversight, policies and partnerships for establishing synthetic DNA screening as a global normConclusionAppendicesContributorsWorld Economic Forum91-93 route de la CapiteCH-1223 Cologny/GenevaSwitzerlandTel.: +41 (0)22 869 1212Fax: +41 (0)22 786 2744Email: contact@weforum.orgwww.weforum.org© 2019 World Economic Forum. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system.Contents3456811131417 3Biosecurity Innovation and Risk Reduction: A Global Framework for Accessible, Safe and Secure DNA Synthesis PrefaceThe Fourth Industrial Revolution describes a world where new technologies and approaches are merging the physical, digital and biological worlds in ways that stand to transform society. Ensuring that this transformation is positive will depend on how the risks and opportunities that arise along the way are navigated. Biotechnology is at the centre of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. To deliver on the promise of the biotechnology revolution, we must seize opportunities to develop and deliver life-advancing innovations while simultaneously and urgently addressing potential risks associated with a growing and democratized bioeconomy. Throughout the process of developing its recommendations, the Working Group recalled that the internet was built without cybersecurity in mind. The same choice now lies before us, at the beginning of the biotechnology revolution. It is a credit to the Working Group that, as the biotechnology revolution is creating undreamed-of possibilities for innovation and industrialization, due consideration is given to managing risk so that the chance to build the biotechnology revolution with biosecurity in mind is not missed.Arnaud Bernaert Head of Shaping the Future of Health and HealthcareWorld Economic Forum 4Biosecurity Innovation and Risk Reduction: A Global Framework for Accessible, Safe and Secure DNA Synthesis ForewordAs a scientist and former government official with responsibility for the United States’ nuclear stockpile, I am acutely aware of both the promise and peril of technological advances. That’s why, after leaving government service in January 2017 and joining the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) to focus on nuclear and biological dangers, one of the first areas I prioritized was the intersection of technology and the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction.When it comes to rapid advances in biotechnology, there is a double-edged sword. New innovations hold the promise of a future that is more resilient to disease, food insecurity and environmental instability, and there is no doubt that advances in genomics, synthetic biology and microbiology will continue to prove essential for a safer, healthier and more secure future for all. At the same time, advances in technology, including cheaper DNA synthesis and widespread access to gene editing tools, have made it possible for a broader array of actors to manipulate biological agents and systems. Together, the innovations and access portend an increase in the risk of a potentially catastrophic biological event, whether deliberate or accidental.It is vital that leaders – technical and policy – understand these risks and have the tools to mitigate them. Unfortunately, we are behind on this front. Today, there is no expert organization or body to provide recommendations and guidance on reducing the biological risks associated with these and future technology advances. With this need in mind, NTI convened the Biosecurity Innovation and Risk Reduction Initiative to bring together global technical experts, international organizations, companies, investors, researchers and their institutions, funders, publishers and insurers to catalyse the adoption of new approaches to reduce biological risks associated with advances in technology.We view DNA synthesis screening as one effective tool to reduce the risk that life science technologies could be deliberately misused to carry out biological attacks or could accidentally result in a high-consequence or catastrophic biological event. Unfortunately, no governments currently require screening for DNA synthesis, and developing, implementing and maintaining screening procedures are becoming increasingly expensive relative to other business costs. This creates an economic disincentive for companies to do the right thing. Potentially compounding the problem is that benchtop DNA synthesis is now within reach, posing significant additional challenges that the international scientific community and global decision-makers have yet to fully imagine.It is time for t